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RECENT CASES
ANTITRUST ACT-DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES-DEFENSES
AVAILABLE TO CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION IN
FURNISHING SERVICES AND FACILITIES
The Federal Trade Commission found a prima facie violation of
section 2 (e) 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act and ordered the defendant,
a dress pattern manufacturer, to end its discriminatory practices of
furnishing certain services and facilities to one group of customers
without charge, while requiring its smaller purchasers to pay for
similar services and facilities. The Court of Appeals, reversing the
Commission, held that under section 2 (b) cost justification might be
affirmatively shown as a defense in a 2 (e) action.2 On certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States, heZd, reversed. Neither cost
justification nor lack of competitive injury is available as a defense
to a charge of violating section 2 (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55
(1959).
The instant case presented for the first time in the Supreme
Court the problem of what defenses are available to a defendant
charged with a 2 (e) violation. The Robinson-Patman Act extended
the original price discrimination provision of the Clayton Act 3 and
also proscribed several other classes of discriminatory acts which had
grown up from efforts to circumvent the price discrimination section.4
Section 2 (a) extends the original prohibitions against direct and indirect price discrimination; section (b) provides for defense of price
and service or facility discriminations by a showing of "justification";
section (c) prohibits payment of brokerage fees and commissions in
connection with a sale of goods to either buyer or seller; section (d)
forbids discriminatory payments by a seller to a buyer for "merchandising services or facilities" furnished by the buyer; and section (e)
prohibits seller discrimination in furnishing services and facilities to
purchasers. The question presented for the court is one of statutory
1. Section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act provides: "That it shall be

unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against
another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale . . . by
contracting to furnish or furnishing . . .any services or facilities connected
with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity
so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally
equal terms." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1952).
2. Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
3. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-44 (1952).
4. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIVINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATmAN ACT 6-11 (rev. ed. 1959); Rowe, The Evolution of the RobinsonPatman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 1059 (1957).
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construction: Does "justification" in section 2 (b) apply to 2 (e) violations so that cost justification and lack of competitive injury qualify as
defenses to a charge of violating 2 (e)? Previously in the 2 (e) cases
the courts of appeals refused to read section (e) in light of the price
discrimination defenses of cost justification 5 or lack of competitive
effect 6 provided in section (a). These opinions had construed sections
(c), (d) and (e) as being parallel7 and divorced from defenses of
section (a).8 These cases had established the rule that prohibition of
the practices set forth in the latter sections constitutes a legislative
judgment that such practices always injure competition and are
therefore, if proved, not susceptible to any defense. 9
It was the defendant's contention that the "justification" allowed
in service and facility discrimination cases permitted showing of
cost differentials in dealing with its respective customers and lack
of competitive injury.'0 In rejecting this theory the Supreme Court
held that a prima facie 2 (e) violation does not require a showing that
the practice has had an injurious or destructive effect on competition." The Court further stated that the first portion of section (b)
was "clearly not intended to have any independent substantive weight
of its own" but was inserted in the House bill for the purpose of
establishing a procedural rule as to the burden of proof. 1 2 The Court,
therefore, in refusing to read section 2(e) in light of section 2(b),
which permits justification, has established what is tantamount to
a per se rule for this type of discrimination.
In reaching this result the Supreme Court's holding is contrary
to the recommendation of the Attorney General's Committee 13 that
the injury to competition and cost justification provisions of section
5. Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Southgate Brokerage

Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945).

Contra, American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir.
1951); National Nut Co. v. Kelling Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Ill. 1945).
6. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 144 F.2d 211, 215 (7th Cir. 1944),

aff'd, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667
(3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940).
7. Note 5 supra.
8. Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 806 (1947); Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.
1945); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTCC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939); Oliver
Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939). The instant case, however, represents the first attempt by a defendant to utilize justification permitted in section 2 (b) as a defense to a 2 (e) violation.
9. Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 638 (1940).
10. Brief for Respondent, pp. 35-53, FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360
U.S. 55 (1959).
11. Accord, Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947). Contra, National Nut Co. v. Kelling Nut Co., 61
F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Ill. 1945); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden
Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).

12. 360 U.S. at 70.
13. ATTORNEY

(1955).
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2 (a) should be consistently applied to sections (c), (d) and (e). The
earlier line of decisions giving sections (c), (d) and (e) significance
apart from the other sections of the act has been criticized 14 as being
contrary to the underlying purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act.15
Discrimination in furnishing services and facilities is ultimately, in
economic effect, equivalent to price discrimination; 16 and the defenses
available to a charge of the latter should, it seems, also be available
to a charge of the former. The Supreme Court has, however, now
foreclosed this approach.

BANKRUPTCY-PRIORITY OF WAGES-EMPLOYER'S
CONTRIBUTIONS TO WELFARE FUNDS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
PRIORITY AS WAGES DUE TO WORKMEN
Pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, respondent employer
was obligated to contribute a fixed amount per month to a union welfare fund on behalf of each of his full time employees, the amount
bearing no relation to hours, wages, or productivity of the individual
employee. Respondent was subsequently adjudged bankrupt. In the
ensuing proceedings the trustees of the fund filed proof of a claim
for unpaid contributions, asserting them to be "wages . .

.

due to

workmen" and, hence, entitled to priority in accordance with section
64(a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act.' The referee rejected the claim of
priority, but on review, this ruling was reversed.2 On writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, with
14. See, e.g., Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L. J. 929, 960-61 (1951).
15. The purpose of the bill was summarized in the Conference Report as
follows: "The object of the bill briefly stated is to amend Section 2 of the
Clayton Act so as to suppress more effectually discriminations between
customers of the same seller not supported by sound economic differences
in their business positions or in the cost of serving them." H.R. REP. No.
2951, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
16. See, e.g., AusTin, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER
TH= ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 114-15, 120-21 (rev. ed. 1953). But see, Fisher,
Section 2(D) and (E) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Babel Revisted, 11 VAND.
L. REV. 453 (1958).

1. 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2) (1958), provides:
"a. The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends
to creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the
order of payment shall be . . . (2) wages and commissions not to exceed
$600 to each claimant, which have been earned within three months
before the date of the commencement of the proceeding, due to workmen,
servants, clerks, or traveling or city salesmen on salary or commission
basis, whole or part time, whether or not selling exclusively for the
bankrupt; . .. (4) taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the
United States or any State or any subdivision thereof .....

2. Matter of Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Pa. 1957),
aff'd, 254 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1958).
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the referee's ruling reinstated. Employers' contributions to union
welfare funds, required by collective bargaining agreements to be
paid to trustees, are not "wages ... due to workmen" and therefore
are not entitled to priority under section 64 (a) (2) of the Bankruptcy
Act. United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959).
3
Wages were first accorded priority in the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.
The priority was shifted and the coverage expanded until 1938,
when it assumed its present form.4 The purpose of granting priority
to wages in bankruptcy proceedings of the employer is to alleviate
the financial shock suffered by subordinate employees who are dependent upon their wages and who are likely to have no substantial savings. 5 To effectuate this policy the phrase "wages . . .
due to workmen" has been construed liberally6 and has been found
to include back pay,7 vacation pay,8 and severance pay.9 With regard
to the question of whether contributions to welfare funds are "wages,"
however, the courts and commentators have split.10 The courts have
3. Act of August 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 444.
4. The Act of August 19, 1841, 5 Stat. 444, established a third priority for
the wages of employees who had performed "labor as an operative" of the
bankrupt. The claim was limited to $25 earned within six months prior to
the commencement of the proceedings. The Bankruptcy Acts of 1867 and
1898 increased the amount available to each claimant and expanded the
coverage from "operatives" to "workmen, clerks, or servants" while lowering the priority to fourth. Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 529; Act of July
1, 1898, 30 Stat. 563. In 1906 still more workers were accorded protection
with the inclusion of "traveling or city salesmen." Act of June 15, 1906, 34
Stat. 267. The amount of the claim was increased again, to $600, by the Act
of May 27, 1926, 44 Stat. 667, which also lowered the priority to fifth. The
Chandler Act passed in 1938 raised the priority to second and further
broadened the class of persons covered, see note 1 supra. This jump in
priority is not as great as it appears, however, since priorities one, two, and
three were grouped together in priority one as administrative expenses. Act
of June 22, 1938, 52 Stat. 874, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
5. The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act itself "is to bring about an equitable
distribution of the bankrupt's estate." Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S.
224 (1929). For a discussion of the purpose of wage priority, see Blessing
v. Blanchard, 223 Fed. 35 (9th Cir. 1915); In re Estey, 6 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y.
1934), and 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 64.202 (14th ed. Moore 1956).
6. "The term wages as used in this section has received a very liberal
construction." In re Roebuck Weather Strip & Wire Screen Co., 180 Fed.
497 (S.D.N.Y. 1910). All courts agree that the "ordinary" and "usual"
meaning of the term "wages" is the one that Congress intended. See, e.g., In
re Gurvitz, 121 Fed. 982 (2d Cir. 1903), which states that wages are the
"agreed compensation for services rendered." See also, N.L.R.B. v. Bemis
Bros. Bag Co., 206 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953) and Glandiz v. Callinicos, 140 F.2d
111 (2d Cir. 1944).
7. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
8. Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Sampsell, 172 F.2d 400 (9th Cir.
1949).
9. McCloskey v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 200 F.2d 402 (9th Cir.
1952).
10. The following cases held that the contributions were wages: Matter of
Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Pa. 1957), af'd, 254 F.2d
475 (3d Cir. 1958); In re Otto, 146 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Cal. 1956); In re
Schmidt, 33 L.R.R.M. 2283 (1953). The following cases reached an opposite
result: In re Sleep Products, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd,
Local 140 Security Fund v. Hack, 242 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1957); In re Victory
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considered the following factors as determinative of whether the contributions are wages: (a) whether or not an assignment has been
made; (b) the significance of the fact that the contributions are immune from income taxation; (c) the interpretation of the term
"wages" in other legislation;" (d) the nature of the employees' interest in the fund; 12 and (e) the method of computation of the contributions.' 3 Prior to the instant case the Supreme Court had not decided
this point.
The Court held that the nature of the contributions precluded a
finding that they were "wages . ..

due to workmen." The contract

referred to them as "contributions"; the fixed sum bore no relation
to the hours, wages or productivity of the individual employee; 14 the
payments were "due to" the trustees of the fund, not to the employees;
and the obligations created by the contract were enforceable only
by the trustees. The Court found the problem to be one of statutory
construction and the fact that industry and the unions consider the
contributions to be "an integral part of the wage package" is of no
importance, nor is the fact that other statutes have been so construed
as to include such contributions as wages. 15 Recognizing the purpose
of wage priority, the Court nevertheless found that the contributions
were not within that purpose in that they offered no aid to the workman in time of financial distress caused by bankruptcy. Moreover, if
the contributions are placed on a par with wages, then they would
effectively compete with the claims of workmen for actual wages so
as to reduce their recovery. In considering whether the contributions
were "due to workmen," the Court found that there was no assignment of the contributions to the trustees by the employees since
the character of the debt was fixed when it was incurred, 16 i.e., the
Apparel Mfg. Corp., 154 F. Supp. 819 (N.J. 1957); In re Brassel, 135 F. Supp.

827 (N.D.N.Y. 1955). Comments supporting the former view are: Note, 66
L. J. 449 (1957); 44 VA. L. REV. 235 (1956); 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 561
(1958). The following notes support the latter view: Forman, Priority of
Union Welfare Funds as Wages in Bankruptcy, 62 COMM. L. J. 321 (1957); 34
Cm-KENT L. REV. 235 (1956); 42 MiNN. L. REV. 295 (1958).

YALE

11. See United States for the Benefit of Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210
(1957) (Miller Act); Inland Steel Co., v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.
1948) (NLRA); City of Avalon, 156 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1946) (Social Security
Act); MacPherson v. Ewing, 107 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (same).
12. See Note, 66 YALE L. J. 449 (1957), for a discussion of the various types
of welfare funds and the employees' interests therein.
13. In In re Schmidt, 33 L.R.R.M. 2283 (S.D. Cal. 1953), one-half the contributions were deducted from employees' wages while the other half was contributed by the employer. And in In re Otto, 146 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Cal.
1956), the case on which the district court and the court of appeals based
their decisions in the principal case, the contributions were based on a rate
of five cents per hour worked. In those cases holding that the contributions
are not wages, the rate has been either a fixed sum or a percentage of the
gross payroll.
14. See note 13 supra.
15. See note 11 supra.
16. It should be noted that there are actually two questions to be answered
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debt at all times was owed to the trustees and not to the employees. 17
It would have been a simple matter for the Court to have reached
an opposite result. The Court, however, strictly limited its discussion
to the Bankruptcy Act and its purposes. The decision would not
have appeared so clear cut had the Court given more consideration to
the economic and social factors 18 which have prompted such things
as welfare funds and recent remedial legislation, e.g., the Social Security Act and the National Labor Relations Act. Perhaps the Court
found some unmentioned impetus in prevailing public sentiment
concerning the increasing power of organized labor. Wage priority
is over a century old and Congress has amended the section many
times. Had the legislature wished, such debts as these contributions
could have been included at any time. Benefits resulting from these
contributions are analogous to many fringe benefits that obtain in
the military; enjoyment of the benefits in each case is dependent upon
membership in the organization rather than upon any employeremployee relationship. The Court's statement as to the competition
which might arise between workmen's claims and the contributions,
should the contributions be included as wages, is not a valid reason for
not finding them to be wages. Insofar as it is support for strictly
limiting the scope of wages, however, a stronger argument could have
been made. It is not difficult to pose a situation, had the Court held
otherwise, in which a qualified employee would be deprived of a
portion of his wage claim should he be independent of the union.
In any event it is believed that the Court's decision is supported by
the better reasoning. It is clear that any change in the present situation will require legislative action. 19
by the Court: whether or not the contributions are wages, and whether or
not they are "due to workmen." Hence, the finding of an assignment or
some form of subrogation in the trustees of the fund is essential to a finding
of a valid priority. Had the Court found an assignment, it would have been
confronted with the rule laid down in Shropshire, Woodcliff & Co. v. Bush,
204 U.S. 186 (1907), in which the Court found that "priority attached to
the debt and not to the person of the creditor; to the claim and not the
claimant." An enforceable assignment was found to exist in In re Ross, 117
F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Cal. 1953). In In re Schmidt, 33 L.R.R.M. 2283 (S.D. Cal.
1953), the court found that the circumstances of that case created "at least
an equitable assignment."
17. For a lucid statement of most of the Court's arguments made two
years before this decision, see Forman, Priority of Union Welfare Funds as
Wages in Bankruptcy. 62 CoMm. L. J. 321 (1957).
18. The court of appeals in the principal case, 254 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1958),
gave voice to the underlying tone of the cases holding contributions to be
wages: "The achievement of complete economic security for industrial
workers is the ultimate aspiration of the American Labor Movement."
19. H.R. 8805, 85 Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), an amendment to the Bankruptcy
Act introduced by Representative Celler on July 19, 1957, and designed to
extend priority to contributions to union welfare funds, failed to be reported
out of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITSAUTOMATIC SUSPENSION OF DEPORTED PERSON'S SOCIAL
SECURITY BENEFITS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
Plaintiff had been awarded $55.60 per month as old age benefits
under the Social Security Act.1 Nine months after the award was
made, plaintiff was deported to Bulgaria because of his past membership in the Communist Party.2 Pursuant to section 202 (n) of the
Social Security Act,3 the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance
immediately suspended payment of plaintiff's old age benefits. Plaintiff, through his wife and attorney, sought to have the benefit payments reinstated and paid to him in Sofia, Bulgaria. A referee of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare ruled that the suspension was proper. On a complaint for statutory review 4 by the
federal district court, held, reversed. The automatic suspension of a
deported person's social security benefits is a denial of due process of
law. Nestor v. Folsom, 169 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1959).
The problem in the instant case could not arise under the older
retirement plans such as servicemen's pensions 5 because the benefits
are gratuitous advances from the governments and may be revoked
1. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950 § 202(a), 64 Stat. 482, 42
U.S.C. § 402 (a) (Supp. V, 1958):
"Every individual who-(1) is a fully insured individual (as defined
in section 414(a) of this title), (2) has attained retirement age (as defined in section 416(a) of this title), and (3) has filed application for
old-age insurance benefits shall be entitled to an old-age insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month after August 1950 in
which such individual becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits and
ending with the month preceding the month in which he dies."
2. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (1958): "Any alien in the United States . . . shall, upon order
of the Attorney General, be deported who-. . . (6) is or at any time has
been, after entry, a member of any of the following classes of aliens: . . .
(C) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with (i) the Communist
Party of the United States....
3. Social Security Act Amendments of 1954 § 107, 68 Stat. 1083, 42 U.S.C. §
402(n) (Supp. V, 1958):
"If any individual is (after the date of enactment of this subsection)
deported under paragraph (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (10), (11),
(12), (14), (15), (16), (17), or (18) of section 241 (a) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, then, notwithstanding any other provisions of this
title-' (A) no monthly benefit under this section shall be paid to such individual, on the basis of his wages and self-employment income, for any
month occurring (i) after the month in which the Secretary [of Health,
Education and Welfare] is notified by the Attorney General that such
individual has been so deported ....
"
4. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 § 205 (g), 53 Stat. 1370, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) (1952):
"Any individual, after any final decision of the Board made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy,
may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action .... in the district
court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff
resides.

..."

5. Walton v. Cotton, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 355 (1856); Coakley v. Attorney
General, 318 Mass. 508, 62 N.E.2d 659 (1945).
6. United States v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64 (1882).
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by the legislature at any time.7 However, when the' states and federal
government created pension plans based partially, at least, upon
compulsory contributions from employees, the questions as to the
nature of a contributing employee's rights in the fund began to arise. 8
The state courts have split on this question. Perhaps a majority of
them 9 have adopted the theory that the retirement benefits- were part
of the emoluments for services rendered, thereby giving the retired
employees vested property rights. 10 Of the federal courts which have
considered the question, the vast majority have held the compulsory
contribution to be taxes upon employment" which give the recipients
no vested interest in the benefits. The benefits therefore are subject
to statutory reduction 12 or revocation 3 at any time.14 A few recent
cases have insisted, however, that the statute reducing or revoking
the benefits not be arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminating.' 5
7. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1895); Abbott v. Morgenthau,
93 F.2d 242 (1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 638 (1938). In this type of case,
however, it has always been held that when a monthly payment became due
before any statutory change had occurred, the interest of the beneficiary
became vested and he had an action against the pension agent for that
monthly payment. Rudolph v. United States, 36 App. D.C. 379 (1911).
8. Even though these pensions are somewhat different in operation from
the Social Security Act system, there seems to be no reasonable basis for
any distinction between the beneficiaries' legal rights under the two.
9. A survey of a state-by-state analysis found in Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 437
(1957) reveals that 17 states (California, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin) hold the pensioner to have a vested property right, while 12
states (Alabama, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey and Texas) hold
that he does not. Apparently the question has not been considered in the
other jurisdictions.
10. Terry v. City of Berkeley, 41 Cal. 2d 698, 263 P.2d 833 (1953); Bender
v. Anglin, 207 Ga. 108, 60 S.E.2d 756 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 878 (1950);
Board of Education v. Louisville, 288 Ky. 656, 157 S.W.2d 337 (1941); Hickey
v. Pension Board, 378 Pa. 300, 106 A.2d 233 (1954).
11. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Cain v. United States, 211 F.2d
375 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954); Abney v. Campbell,
206 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924 (1954); Canfield v.
Ewing, 108 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
12. Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74 (1937); MacLeod v. Fernandez, 101 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1938), cert denied, 308 U.S. 561 (1939).
13. Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 (1889); Price v. Folsom, 168 F. Supp. 392
(D.N.J. 1959); Mullowney v. Folsom, 156 F. Supp. 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
14. But see Ewing v. Gardner, 185 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1950), holding that
when wage-earner made application for old age insurance benefits but
failed to furnish the necessary proof of age, the benefits accrued at that
time so as to enable his executor to recover the primary benefits after the
wage-earner's death upon furnishing proof that the wage-earner was sixtyfive at the time of application, and Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp.
590 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (concurring opinion), stating that a retired federal employee had such vested property rights in his retirement pension that it
could not be revoked due to his refusal to testify before a federal grand
jury on grounds of self-incrimination. The holding of the majority was that
the retired employee had no vested property rights but the gratuitous benefits could not be revoked by an arbitrary and unreasonable statute.
15. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp.
590 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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The court in the instant case relied upon two earlier federal court
opinions 16 in concluding that the plaintiff had a vested property right
in the deprived benefits 7 but recognized the existence of many
federal cases to the contrary' 8 and did not rest its decision upon
that conclusion alone. The power of Congress to revise, alter or
reduce payments or to impose conditions upon the beneficiary was
recognized,' 9 but the court made a distinction between those changes
and a complete deprivation of the benefits. 20 This was in accord
with the principle expressed in Steinberg v. United States21 that even

though the benefits were a gratuity from the government, they could
not be revoked in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. The court
thought it to be an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination to distinguish between persons who have been deported and those who
have not been deported in determining who should receive old age
benefits under the Social Security Act.2
Since the Supreme Court has held that the compulsory contributions by employees into the social security fund are taxes upon
employment 23 and since Congress has retained an unqualified right
to dispose of the funds,24 it is difficult to see how plaintiff had a vested
property right in the deprived benefits. 25 It is doubtful, however,
that any useful purpose will be served by characterizing plaintiff's
rights as "vested" or "nonvested"; the final decision 26 will probably
turn on whether section 202 (n) unreasonably discriminates against
16. Ewing v. Gardner and Steinberg v. United States, supra note 14.
17. 169 F. Supp. at 934.
18. Id. at 929.

19. Id. at 934.
20. "[M]ust it logically follow that because Congress has the power to exercise such revision or alteration that it may also completely deprive one of
such benefits after they have fully accrued? This Court does not believe
so." Ibid.
21. 163 F. Slipp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958). This case relied upon the Wieman
case, note 14 supra, as authority for the proposition that gratuitous benefits
cannot be revoked by a statute that is arbitrary and unreasonably discriminating.
22. 169 F. Supp. at 934.
23. See note 11 supra.
24. Social Security Act § 1104, 49 Stat. 648 (1936), 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (1952):
"The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this Act is hereby
reserved to the Congress." Congress has repeatedly used this clause and the
amendments have sometimes reduced benefits of those included or excluded
groups which were formerly covered by the act. For a listing of such
amendments and a discussion of how each has worked to the disadvantage of
some groups see: Wollenberg, Vested Rights in Social-Security Benefits, 37
ORE. L. REV. 299, 308-31 (1958). Also see Social Security Act § 207, 49 Stat.
624 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1952) (future payments under the act not
transferable or assignable by the beneficiary).
25. Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74 (1937); Pennie v. Reis, 132
U.S. 464 (1889); MacLeod v. Fernandez, 101 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 561 (1939); Price v. Folsom, 168 F. Supp. 392 (D.N.J. 1959);
Mullowney v. Folsom, 156 F. Supp. 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Steinberg v. United
States, 163 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
26. A notice of appeal to the Supreme Court was filed on June 25, 1959,
sub. nom. Flemning v. Nestor, 360 U.S. 915 (1959).
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the group of which plaintiff is a member. Even though at least some
of the basic rights protected by the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment against state action are likewise protected by
the due process clause of the fifth amendment against action by the
federal government, 27 this fact does not invalidate all discriminatory
federal legislation. Congress may still classify and discriminate
against groups if the legislation excluding a class is reasonably related
to the attainment of the otherwise valid legislative objective.8
Although not always a permissible basis for exclusion, alienage alone
has been recognized as a valid basis for denying persons the receipt
of public relief 29 and employment on public works. 30 Where, as in
the instant case, there is the additional factor of nonresidence, the
basis for legislative discrimination is even more substantial. 31 The
object of the Social Security Act is to provide people in this country
with a minimum security after the disability of age has rendered
them incapable of performing work.m The provision denying benefits
to aliens who have been deported seems reasonably related to this
object.
27. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
28. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1946); Hirabayaski v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
29. Work Relief and Public Works Appropriation Act of 1938 § 11, 52 Stat.
809, 813.
30. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915). Other cases where alienage has
been upheld as a valid ground for distinction are: Clarke v. Deckebach,
274 U.S. 392 (1927) (aliens excluded from operation of pool and billard
halls); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (aliens excluded from
hunting wild game). Cases which have invalidated discriminatory legislation based on alienage are: Takahaski v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948) (aliens excluded from carrying on commercial fishing in coastal
waters); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (statutory presumption
that when alien ineligible for citizenship paid the consideration for land
conveyed to another the purpose was to evade the Alien Land Law); Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (employer prohibited from employing more
than a specified percentage of alien employees); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese excluded from operation of a laundry).
31. It is to be noted that not only those aliens who have been deported for
being communists are deprived of their old age benefits by section 202(n)
but all deported aliens except those who have become institutionalized because of insanity within five years after entry, those who have become
public charges, those who were admitted as nonimmigrants but have failed
to maintain the nonimmigrant status and those who have knowingly and
for gain assisted or tried to assist any other alien in gaining entrance into
this country contrary to its laws. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241 (a),
66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1958). In 1956, Congress again
amended the Social Security Act so as to exclude those four classes of deported aliens who were omitted by § 202 (n) as well as many aliens who voluntarily absent themselves from the country more than six months. Social
Security Act Amendments of 1956 § 118(a), 70 Stat. 835, 42 U.S.C. § 402(t)
(Supp. V, 1958). It can be seen that the policy of Congress is to suspend
payments of old-age benefits to all aliens who are absent from the United
States.
32. Helvering v. Davis, supra note 11, at 641. Here the court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Cardozo, said, "The hope behind this statute is to save
men and women from the rigors of the poor house as well as from the
haunting fear that such a lot awaits them when journey's end is near."
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNION SHOP AGREEMENT UNDER
RAILWAY LABOR ACT VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF EMPLOYEES
Defendants, labor unions and railroad employers, entered into
union shop agreements' pursuant to a 1951 amendment to the Railway
Labor Act.2 Plaintiffs, individual railroad employees whose service
antedated the execution of these agreements, brought suit in the
Superior Court of Georgia to enjoin their enforcement. Plaintiffs
claimed a violation of their rights under the first, fifth, ninth, and
tenth amendments to the federal constitution. The trial court granted
an injunction. 3 On appeal, held, affirmed. Section 2 (11) of the Railway Labor Act, and union shop agreements executed thereunder
compelling employees as a condition of continued employment to
pay dues to unions which use such funds for political activity opposed
by the employees, violate their rights to freedom of speech and
deprive them of their property without due process of law, in contravention of the federal constitution. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 108 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. 1959).
The Supreme Court resolved practically all of the questions inherent in the union shop provision 4 of the Railway Labor Act in
Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson.5 That case held that this section
constituted federal action so as to warrant consideration in the light
1. Under a union shop agreement, employees must join the union within
a specified time after employment in order to retain their job. This is to
be distinguished from a closed shop agreement under which only union
members may be hired.
2. 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (11) (1952). This amendment
permits union shop agreements between railroads and labor unions, subject
to certain conditions, notwithstanding any state law to the contrary.
3. The trial court granted a perpetual injunction against the enforcement
of these agreements, but there was included therein a proviso which indicated
a willingness to dissolve the injunction upon a showing of the termination
of political activity. 108 S.E.2d at 803. This is inconsistent with the holding
that this section of the Railway Labor Act is unconstitutional. Should not
the court have then held that the statute did not authorize political expenditures, and that these particular agreements were not made pursuant to the
act insofar as they allowed such expenditures?
4. The congressional attitude toward union security agreements has been
anything but consistent. The Railway Labor Act of 1926 expressly prohibited
both union shop and closed shop contracts. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §

152 (5) (1952).

The National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, applicable

to nonrailroad employment relations, permitted both types of agreements.
49 Stat. 452 (1935). In 1947 the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act amended the Wagner Act so as to prohibit closed shop contracts and to
permit union shop agreements only when such were permitted by the
state. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952). This amendment
to the Railway Labor Act, passed in 1951, authorizes union shop agreements
in the railroad industry "notwithstanding .. . any other statute.., of any
state .

. . ."

64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (11)

(1952).

5. 351 U.S. 225 (1956), reversing Hanson v. Union Pac. R.R., 160 Neb. 669,
71 N.W.2d 526 (1955). The record of the Hanson case differs from that in the
Street case only in that the former contained no indication of political expenditures by the labor unions.
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of the first and fifth amendments, 6 that it was a valid exercise of
the commerce power, 7 and that it did not violate the first and fifth
amendments on its face. 8 The problem is not what the Hanson case
held, but what it meant in reserving its opinion on "the exaction of
dues, initiation fees, or assessments . . . used as a cover for forcing
ideological conformity or other action. . . ."9 The question is whether

the Court alluded, in this reservation, to a case where the record
shows political expenditures by the unions for purposes which a
minority of its members oppose, or to a case in which the union
forces its members personally to engage, or refrain from engaging,
in political activity.
The Supreme Court of Georgia construed the Hanson case as leaving open for future determination the constitutionality of political
expenditures by the union which are opposed by a minority of its
membership.10 Upon this construction, the court proceeded to declare
such expenditures invalid as a violation of the first and fifth amendments. Although the court's reasoning is not clear, it must have
arrived at its conclusion in this manner: an agreement made pursuant
to the union shop section of the act forces an employee to choose
between (a) losing his job or (b) making financial contributions to
a union, a substantial part of which will be used for political purposes
which he in fact opposes; the former is a taking of his property and,
not being reasonable under the circumstances, is a violation of due
process;11 the latter encroaches upon the employee's freedom of speech
and right to associate, and, there being no clear and present danger
6. In so holding, the court incidentally decided the question of federal

pre-emption. There would seem to be no problem here anyway because of
the express wording of the act.
7. This section was passed to eliminate the tense situation created by
nonunion employees receiving the benefits of collective bargaining by the
union without paying for them. It was believed that the elimination of "freeriders" would cut down on strikes in the railroad industry. 351 U.S. at 233.
8. The court refused to interfere with the wisdom of this method and
dismissed the first amendment objection with an analogy to an integrated
bar. 351 U.S. at 238. In so doing the Court impliedly rejected the argument
that there is no right not to associate under the first amendment.
9. "It is argued that compulsory membership will be used to impair freedom of expression. But that problem is not presented by this record.
Congress endeavored to safeguard against that possibility by making explicit that no conditions to membership may be imposed except as respects
'periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments.' If other conditions are in
fact imposed, or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used
as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention
of the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision in
that case." 351 U.S. at 238.
10. The trial court dismissed this case upon the first hearing on the grounds
that the Hanson case was controlling. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, holding that this case presented the question reserved in Hanson.
Looper v. Georgia, So. & Fla. Ry., 99 S.E.2d 101 (Ga. 1957).
11. This seems to be untenable in the light of the Supreme Court's refusal
in Hanson to question the legislative wisdom from the due process standpoint.
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to justify this encroachment, violates the first and fifth amendments. 12
Freedoms of the individual, embodied in the first and fifth amendments, have been vigorously protected by the courts, and at times
have even been said to occupy a "preferred position."'1 3 However, it
is generally said that these freedoms are not absolutes, and that in
considering an alleged violation thereof, courts must weigh the conflicting interests involved.14 Political expression is one of the rights
guaranteed under the first amendment.' 5 But even in an area so
fundamental to democracy, the Supreme Court allowed the federal
government to prohibit any federal employee from engaging in
political activity. 6 Of course, this was allowed because of the strong
public interest in an efficient civil service. The Hanson case seems
to indicate that there is no justification for such an interference with
personal political activity in the union shop situation. But the record
in this case indicates no such direct interference. On the contrary,
it shows that the employees are completely free to engage in any
17
political activity they choose so long as they pay dues to the union.
The only infringement upon their freedom of speech is the use of
their money by the union in accordance with the wishes of a
majority of the members. 18 Weighing the conflicting interests in
12. The Georgia court must have adopted the view often expressed by the
Supreme Court, although not always through a majority, that any statute
which restricts first amendment freedoms "must be justified by clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present
danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the
evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against
attack on due process grounds, will not suffice." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945). See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
13. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
14. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (concurring opinion);
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). For a good
discussion of this view, see FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT
27-28 (1949).
15. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
16. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), upholding the
Hatch Act, 53 Stat. 1148 (1940), as amended, 64 Stat. 475 (1950), 5 U.S.C.
118 (i) (Supp. V, 1958).
17. Actually it is very doubtful that there could ever be a direct interference with the employees' personal political activity. The statute specifically
provides that union membership, required by a union shop agreement, may
be conditioned only upon the payment of dues, fees, and assessments. Sec. 2
(11) of the Railway Labor Act, supra note 2. Therefore, in the last analysis
it may be found that Hanson reserved no constitutional question at all. Any
direct interference with employees' political activity would not be protected
by this statute.
18. In the case of an integrated bar association, or any compulsory membership in a bar association in spite of the individual's wishes, the lawyer
is faced with a similar choice to that of petitioners in the instant case-he
must join the association or lose his right to practice law. Constitutional
objections in this area have never been upheld. Carpenter v. State Bar of
Calif., 211 Cal. 358, 295 Pac. 23 (1931); Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass'n, 40
So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949); In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933);
In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265
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such a situation, there is found a strong public interest in the free
flow of commerce, as indicated by the holding in Hanson, balanced
against the interest in preserving the sanctity of the first amendment
freedoms, keeping in mind the indirectness or remoteness of the invasion. In view of the fact that even a direct interference has been
held justified, 19 it would seem probable that the Supreme Court will
not consider this indirect invasion, far less offensive to speech, as
being unreasonable under the circumstances.

CORPORATIONS-SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934-LIABILITY OF DIRECTOR FOR PROFITS ON STOCK
ACQUIRED PRIOR TO ELECTION AS CORPORATE OFFICIAL
Defendant, a corporate director, was accused in a derivative action
of violating section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1
Section 16(b) provides for recovery by a corporation of any profit
realized as a result of a purchase and sale of any stock of the corporation within a six months period by any director, officer or any
beneficial owner of more than ten percent of the corporation's
securities. The defendant acquired his stock prior to his election to
the board of directors, but sold it while a director and within six
months of its acquisition. The district court held the director liable
for the profits. On appeal, held, affirmed. The Securities Exchange
Act is designed to prevent any insider from using restricted information, even one who acquires his stock prior to his election as a director.
Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
Section 16 (b) was enacted to prevent insiders from using informa(1937); In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P.2d 643 (1931); People ex rel.

Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928); In re Integration of State
Bar of Okla., 185 Okla. 505, 95 P.2d 113 (1939); Kelley v. State Bar of Okla.,
148 Okla. 282, 298 Pac. 623 (1931). Although decisions in this area are
often based upon the fact that law is a special privilege calling, the constitutional rights of a lawyer are certainly no different from that of one
who pursues a common calling.
19. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra note 16.
1. This action is expressly provided for in the Securities Exchange Act:
"(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase of any equity security
of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of
less then six months ... shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director,
or officer .... This section shall not be construed to cover any transaction
when such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase of the securities involved . . . ." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1952).
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tion available to them by virtue of their strategic position2 because
such information is not usually available to the average stockholder.3
Prior to this time the ordinary stockholder was unprotected from such
manipulation. 4 The litigation involving section 16 (b) has been limited,
but when called on to interpret its provisions, the courts have on the
whole broadly construed the legislative policy. For example, they
have decided that proof of actual use of inside information is not
necessary to the action 5 and that the application of the statute is
not limited to the purchase and sale of identical shares within a six
months period. 6 Although section 16 (b) requires that the stock be
registered on a national exchange, the sanctions of 16 (b) are applicable if unregistered stock is first registered in the interval between
the purchase and sale. 7 In defining a sale, the courts have held that
an option to buy stock extended by a corporation constitutes a sale
as does a corporate offer to purchase.8 An initial ten percent purchase
has been construed as fulfilling the requirement of 16 (b) that the
beneficial owner be such at the time of purchase.9 Prior to the instant
case no occasion had arisen requiring the courts to decide whether
stock purchased by a director prior to his election and sold within
six months is subject to the provisions of 16 (b) .1o
Section 16(b) specifically provides that a beneficial owner must
2. "qt is clear that the primary aim of the legislation was to destroy 'the
vicious practices unearthed at the hearings' involving 'the flagrant betrayal
of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers'." Cook & Feldman, Ins;der
Trading Under The Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REv.385, 397 (1953).
See also for a discussion of this problem Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d
231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 721 (1943); Tracy & MacChesney,
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. Rav. 1025 (1934); Hearings
on S. 84 Before Committee on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934).
3. Hearings on S. 56 and S. 97, Before Committee on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1934).
4. The intended reform seems to have been relatively successful, although
it has been criticized. The section offers such simplicity in enforcement that
violators have often rectified their wrongs rather than involve themselves in
useless litigation. The arbitrary requirements of ten percent holders and six
months purchase and sale were designed to eliminate the greatest percentage
of the wrongs, although it was realized that innocent parties would be involved. See Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under The Securities Exchange
Act, 66 I-HAv. L. REv.385, 397 (1953).
5. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.denied, 320
U.S. 721 (1943).
6. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951). For discussion of "class" of stocks, see 12 VAND. L. REV. 928 (1959).

7. Arbetman v. Playford, 83 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
8. Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954); Blau v. Allen, 163 F.
Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
9. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
For a discussion of this see Seligman, Problems under the Securities Exchange
Act, 21 VA. L. REv.1, 20 (1934).

10. But note that the same district court that decided the present case
originally (another judge sitting) made a like decision in handing down
another case seven months later without reference to its decision. Blau v.
Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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own at least ten percent of the corporation's stock both at the time

of purchase and sale to come within the statute's prohibitions. The
problem for the court in the instant case was therefore whether or
not this requirement should be read into the director-officer portion
of the section. The court concluded, the purpose of the law requiring
an accounting and payment of profits for the purpose of preventing
the unfair use of information obtained by a director by reason of
his relationship to the issuer, would be defeated if it did not apply
here." The court's conclusion is based, however, on the theory of
leading text authorities 2 that the rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,'3 should be applied in this situation.
Since the legislature expressly included the requirement in the
portion of the statute relating to a beneficial owner, it is assumed
that Congress intended to exclude the requirement in the directorofficer portion of the statute.14 The court rejects the defendant's
argument that the Securities and Exchange Commission has exempted
the transaction here under dispute from the coverage of section
16 (b).15
Section 16 (b) has been under strong attack since its enactment 16
on the ground that it produces more evils than it eliminates, 7 but
its constitutionality has been repeatedly upheld.18 These critics claim
that the Internal Revenue Code is itself a deterrent to would be
violators since it requires securities to be held for six months in order
for a profit realized through resale to qualify as a capital gain. 9 Since
the expressed purpose of this section is to prevent the unfair use of
inside information, and since the defendant had no such information
11. 267 F.2d at 844.
12. Loss, SEcuRITEs REGULATION 578 (1951); Rubin & Feldman, Statutory
Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA.
L. REV. 468, 488 (1947).
13. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION §§ 4915-17 (3d ed. 1943). This
rule is used to determine the legislative intent in situations where a statute
makes a provision in reference to one of two elements, but not to both.
14. Supra note 12.
15. Defendant claims that rule X-16A-10, 17 C.F.R. § 204.16a-10 (1958
Supp.), allows anyone exempted by the Commission from reporting requirements of section 16(a) shall also be exempt from section 16(b). The court
agrees with the interpretation of the rule, but it holds that the defendant's
contention that section 16(a) requires a director to report only when he
makes a purchase and sale rather then with a change in ownership is wrong,
and therefore, he is not exempt from section 16(a). 267 F.2d at 847.
16. Loss, op. cit. supra note 12, at 578.
17. Id. at 579. Notice that it is those parties who are controlled by the
section who have made these attacks.
18. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v. Relendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 289 § 117 (g) (1) (i), 52 STAT. 502 (1938)
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 1233). For a discussion of how the INT. REV.
CODE acts within this field see Loss, SEcURITIEs REGULATION 264-65 (Supp.

1955).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 13

at the time of the first transaction,20 i.e., when he purchased the stock,
on first impression the application of 16(b) to this situation seems
doubtful. 21 The utilization of section 16(b) under this circumstance

might withhold from an innocent investor an honest profit,2 2 but we
must be aware at the same time that it fulfills its main purpose of
withholding the profitable use of inside information gained at any
time. The matter of deciding whether the harm to the innocent few
is more important than the effectiveness of the statute is a legislative
problem, and it is well established that Congress considered the
latter the more desirable2

DAMAGES-QUASI CONTRACT-EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN
QUASI CONTRACT WHEN DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF FRAUD
Plaintiff offered to purchase certain realty for $4,000 an acre,
but defendant, falsely representing that he was the exclusive agent
for the owner, replied that the owner would not accept less than
$5,000 an acre. After plaintiff agreed to pay the larger amount, defendant purchased the land from the owner at the smaller figure and
resold it to plaintiff at the agreed price, retaining the difference as
20. The term "transaction" is inserted rather than "purchase" for under the
statute it matters not whether the violation involves a sale and purchase or
a purchase and sale.
21. The argument could be raised, that in the present case the rule of
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., supra note 18, would not be justified, for the presumption that inside information was used is based on the insider holding a
position that will allow him access to such information. In the present case
this vital element is missing. Such an argument requires the assumption that
section 16(b) requires two transactions since it refers to "any purchase and
sale or any sale and purchase." (Emphasis added.) In this theory the first
transaction is the critical one since this is the point at which the plan of
action is plotted. One who is an insider at the time of the first transaction will
be in position to use inside information in this first transaction to set up the
profit at the time of the second transaction, but one who is not in such a
position can not set in motion this process. The fallacy in this argument is
that section 16(b) is designed to cut out all use of inside information, therefore even the slightest use of inside information at the time of the second
transaction (as, for example, to determine when best to sell) would be
enough to warrant punishment. Therefore, the only way to exclude the
innocent party is by a trial on the facts to prove whether or not at the time
of the second transaction he made use of inside information. To require
such a trial might so defeat the effectiveness of section 16(b) that the inclusion of innocent parties would be warranted. This is a well established right
of the legislature. "A classification having some reasonable basis does not
offend the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
is not made with mathematical nicety or scientific exactness, or because in
practice it actually results in some inequality." 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§505 (1956).
22. The court has correctly interpreted the statute, and since the statute
expressly rules out the use of intent the innocent party has no means by
which to exonerate himself.
23. Loss, op. cit. supra note 12, at 564.
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secret profits. A state statute1 limited recovery in tort actions to outof-pocket damages, 2 and plaintiff failed to show that the land was not
worth what he paid for it. The trial court nevertheless entered judgment in an action in deceit against defendant for the amount of the
secret profits ($72,029.20) and for $36,000 exemplary damages. On
appeal to the state supreme court, held, affirmed. Although the only
theory on which plaintiff may recover is that of quasi contract, 3 exemplary as well as compensatory damages may be awarded when
the defendant is guilty of fraud. Ward v. Taggart, 336 P.2d 534 (Cal.
1959).
Punitive damages are commonly recoverable in actions of tort
which involve malice,4 fraud5 or a wanton disregard of the rights
of the plaintiff.6 The overwhelming majority of the cases deny
recovery of exemplary damages in actions based solely on breach
of contract. 7 The primary exception to this rule at common law was
in the case of breach of promise to marry,8 but a few jurisdictions
will allow recovery of punitive damages in actions for breach of
contract when the breach is accompanied by a tortious 9 or by a
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343 (Deering 1949), limits recovery in damages for
fraud in purchase or sale of land to "out-of-pocket" losses. See Bagdasarian
v. Gragnon, 31 Cal.2d 744, 762, 763, 192 P.2d 935 (1948).
2. In applying CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343 (Deering 1949) to the sale of a farm,
the Supreme Court of California had held that where the statute provides
that the defrauded party is entitled to recover the difference between the
actual value of that with which he parted and the actual value of that which
he received, the benefit-of-bargain rule is inapplicable as the measure of
recovery and damages are limited to out-of-pocket losses. Bagdasarian v.
Gragnon, 31 Cal.2d 744, 192 P.2d 935 (1948). See McCoRM cK, DAMAGES § 121
(1935).
3. Although this theory of recovery was not advanced in the trial court,
it seems to be settled law in California that a change of theory is permitted
on appeal when the only question presented is one of law. Panopulos v.
Maderis, 47 Cal.2d 337, 341, 303 P.2d 738, 741 (1956).
4. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897).
5. Treesh v. Stone, 51 Cal. App. 708, 197 Pac. 425 (1921).
6. Hintz v. Roberts, 98 N.J.L. 768, 121 Atl. 711 (1923).
7. In the leading English case of Addis v. Gramophone Co., the House of
Lords decided that punitive damages could not be recovered in an action
ex contractu; and one of the reasons given by Lord Shaw (concurring opinion)
was that if the plaintiff had a cause of action in tort for the wrongful act
accompanying the breach, he could recover punitive damages in a tort action;
but if not, the wrongful act should not become actionable or relevant as an
element of aggravation of breach of contract. Addis v. Gramophone Co.,
(1909) A.C. 488, 3 B.R.C. 98, 16 Ann. Cas. 98. For the corresponding American
view, see American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Bailey, 142 Miss. 622, 107 So. 761 (1926);
McCORmICK, DAMAGES § 81 (1935).

8. Exemplary damages were recoverable at common law for a breach of
promise to marry because the measure of damages applicable to ordinary
contracts was thought to be inadequate. The theory seems to be that since
society favors marriage, a breach of promise to marry not only injures the
disappointed party but in a remote sense the breach also injures society.
Thorn v. Knapp, 42 N.Y. 474, 1 Am. Rep. 561 (1870).
9. The Texas courts allow recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract if the breach is accompanied by a tort which would support punitive
damages. See Hooks v. Fitzenrieter, 76 Tex. 277, 13 S.W. 230 (1890); Briggs
v. Rodriguez, 236 S.W.2d 510, 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that if the breach is attended
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fraudulent'0 act. The action of quasi contract is restitutionary in nature, liability being imposed by law without regard to the assent of
the party bound whenever a benefit has been received under circumstances which would render its retention inequitable." In the few
cases considering the question of allowing punitive damages in an
action of restitution where the defendant was guilty of fraud,12 the
courts have differed in their quest for a solution. One approach has
been to consider the question in terms of election of remedies. Under
this theory the plaintiff is said to have waived the tort if he elects to
sue in assumpsit, and since assumpsit is an action ex contractu, punitive damages are not allowed. 3 At least one court bases its decision on
whether or not there is a fiduciary relationship between the vendor
and vendee, and does not consider whether the action is the common
law action for deceit.' 4 While recognizing the general rule that punitive damages cannot usually be recovered upon a mere breach of contract, a Texas court has held that the rule is restricted to actual
contracts and does not apply to fictitious ones. 15 Without regard to
by some "intentional wrong," "insult," or "gross negligence" which amounts
to an independent tort, they will allow punitive damages to be recovered
for the breach. American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Bailey, 142 Miss. 622, 107 So. 761,
763 (1926); D. L. Fair Lumber Co. v. Weems, 196 Miss. 201, 16 So.2d 770, 773
(1944).
10. South Carolina seems to be the foremost protagonist for the minority
of states which allow punitive damages for breach of contract. For an extensive examination of the rule in South Carolina of allowing punitive damages where the breach is accompanied by a fraudulent act, see Note, 10
S.C.L.Q. 444 (1958).
In Whitehead v. Allen, 63 N.M. 63, 313 P.2d 335 (1957), the New Mexico
Supreme Court affirmed an award of exemplary damages against a seed
buyer who breached his contract by falsifying weight records.
11. Bicknell v. Garrett, 1 Wash. 2d 564, 96 P.2d 592, 595 (1939); Nelson
v. Preston, 262 Wis. 547, 55 N.W.2d 918, 919 (1952); KEENER, QUAsI-CONTRACTS,
ch. 1 (1893).

12. The courts generally agree that absent fraud, punitive damages may
not be recovered in an action for money had and received. See, e.g.,
Watkins v. Hovey, 88 F. Supp. 478 (W.D.Mo. 1950).
13. In Young v. Main, 72 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1934), the court held where a
contract is obtained by fraud, plaintiff has an election to affirm the contract
and sue in tort for damages or to repudiate the contract and recover the
purchase price in an action for money had and received. Where the plaintiff
elects to waive the tort and sue in assumpsit he is not allowed to recover
punitive damages. The reasons given by the court for not allowing punitive
damages in an action for money had and received are that punitive damages
are not allowed in a contract action and that no cases are cited which allow
punitive damages in an action for money had and received. For an article
expressing doubt as to the whole doctrine of waiver of tort and suit in assumpsit, see, Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221, 24346 (1910). In discussing the doctrine of election, Professor Corbin states that
the tort is not waived for it is the very foundation for the implied-in-law
promise to make restitution. The cause of action is said to be tort from first
to last and the assumpsit action in these cases is a mere fiction and not the
cause of action.
14. Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
15. In the leading Texas case of Briggs v. Rodriguez, 236 S.W.2d 510 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951), the court stated that the common law forms of actions have
never been used or recognized in Texas and that where a purchaser of realty
brings an action for money had and received based on fraud of the vendor,
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punitive damages, courts are occasionally called upon',t6 'classify an
action in restitution as either being ex contractu or ex delicto in order
to determine the applicable statute of limitations. The cases are
divided as to whether the form 16 or the gravamen 7 of the action controls selection of the proper statute.
In the case at hand the court was called upon to construe a statute
which authorizes exemplary damages in "an action for the breach
of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has
been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice .. . .,18 The court interpreted the prohibiting word "contract" in the statute to mean an
agreement between the parties and not an obligation implied by law.
The court further held that the plaintiff did not waive the tort by
suing in quasi contract since the defendant's fraud was the foundation
of the implied-in-law promise to return the secret profits. Having
determined that the basis for plaintiff's action in restitution was
deceit and not breach of contract, the court ruled that the award of
exemplary damages was allowable under the statute.
Under the construction of the statute limiting damages in a tort
action for deceit to out-of-pocket losses, the defrauding defendant
could in no event lose by his fraud. Restitution would have little or
no deterrent effect on the wrongdoer, for his only risk would be
that he would be forced to return what he wrongfully obtained.19
Since punitive or exemplary damages are awarded in order to punish
the defendant and to deter others from committing like offenses,
rather than to reward the plaintiff, 20 it seems appropriate that such
an award be made regardless of the theory of plaintiff's action-if
the situation otherwise justifies such an award. While the court in the
exemplary damages may be awarded. The defendant argued that an action
of implied contract for money had and received was contractual in nature
and would not support an award of punitive damages. The court held that
exemplary damages cannot usually be recovered upon a mere breach of
contract, but the rule is restricted to actual contracts and not to fictitious

ones. In discussing the doctrine of election of remedies the court ruled that a
plaintiff does not waive his right to exemplary damages by suing for return
of consideration which he had parted with because of the defendant's fraud.
16. Bates v. Bates Mach. Co., 230 Ill. 619, 82 N.E. 911 (1907); Lamb v.
Clark, 5 Pick. 193 (Sup. Ct. 1827). It was held in both of these cases that
an action on an implied contract arising out of fraud was not barred if the
remedy in assumpsit was not barred, even though the statute had run against
the action of fraud. The courts held that the form determined which statute
would be applicable.
17. In Orozem v. McNeill, 103 Kan. 429, 175 Pac. 633 (1918), the court held
that the nature of the cause of action and not the form determines which
statute is applicable, therefore where the action is based on fraud the statute
of limitations governing the action is the statute which governs actions of
fraud. This is so even though the action is on an implied contract.
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (Deering 1949).
19. See Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal. App. 2d 435, 454-455, 261 P.2d 529 (1953);
Hartzell v. Myall, 115 Cal. App. 2d 670, 252 P.2d 676 (1953); Devers v. Greenwood, 139 Cal. App. 2d 345, 350, 293 P.2d 834 (1956).
20. E.g., French v. Deane, 19 Colo. 504, 36 Pac. 609 (1894); Chesapeake &
O.R.R. Co. v. Johns' Adm'x, 155 Ky. 264, 159 S.W. 822 (1913).
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instant case did not hold that punitive damages would be awarded
regardless of the statute, it unequivocably ruled that such an award
was appropriate in a restitutionary action of quasi contract. The
defendant's conduct and the facts pleaded by the plaintiff concerned
the court more than the form or theory of the plaintiff's action. The
award of exemplary damages was allowed on the grounds of suppressing fraud and upholding the public policy of the state. This seems
justified in a state following either code or common law pleading.
The approach in the instant case should be particularly useful to a
state not having a statute which controls the awarding of punitive
damages.

EVIDENCE-OTHER CRIMES-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF
PRIOR CRIMES HAVING FEATURES COMMON TO
CRIME CHARGED
In a criminal prosecution for rape, the oral testimony of a witness
that she had been raped by defendant five days prior to the alleged
rape of the prosecutrix was offered in evidence. Defense counsel
objected, contending that this evidence' was inadmissible under the
rule excluding evidence of prior bad conduct where the defense has
not put character in issue. The trial court admitted the witness'
testimony, and defendant was convicted. On appeal, held, affirmed.
Evidence of the commission of a prior crime which has features
common to the crime charged is admissible as an exception to the
general rule in order to show a plan or scheme. State v. Finley,
85 Ariz. 327, 338 P.2d 790 (1959).
Evidence of prior criminal acts is inadmissible where it is only
relevant to prove defendant's disposition as a basis of an inference
that he committed the crime charged.2 The rationale of this rule
is that the danger of prejudice in admitting the evidence outweighs
its probative value.3 The courts, however, have admitted evidence of
1. Defendant objected to two other rulings of the court concerning the
admissibility of evidence. Prosecutrix, thirty minutes after the alleged rape,
made a statement to a policeman concerning what had transpired with defendant. The prosecution offered in evidence the testimony of the policeman
concerning the victim's story to him, and over defendant's objection, the
testimony was admitted as part of the res gestae. Furthermore, the defense
objected to introduction of evidence by the prosecution as to the reputation
of the prosecutrix. The court admitted the testimony on the grounds that
where consent in a rape case is put in issue it is proper for the state to call
character witnesses to testify to her reputation for morality.
2. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 311 (1942); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 189 (1954); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDECE rule 47 (1953); 2 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 357 (3d ed. 1940).
3. Wigmore states three reasons for the exclusion of this evidence: "(1)
The over-strong tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the charge
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prior criminal acts where it is not introduced to prove defendant's
disposition to commit the act, but has independent relevancy to show
motive,4 intent, 5 absence of accident or mistake, 6 identity,7 or common
scheme or plan.8 The last exception is different from the others in
that it is not an element of the crime to be proved, but is proof of a
preconceived plan to show that the crime charged was executed
pursuant to this plan.9 Since the first four exceptions are relevant
only to prove an element of the crime and the scheme or plan principle is relevant in proving the actual commission of the crime, there
is a higher degree of proof required to establish a plan or scheme. 10
Evidence of mere similarities between prior acts and the crime
charged is generally inadmissible to prove a scheme or plan," and
in cases where this evidence has been admitted ostensibly under the
scheme or plan exception, its probative value has also been relevant
to one of the other exceptions. 12 In the cases admitting evidence based
on a single prior act, the evidence was admitted to prove motive,13
merely because he is a likely person to do such acts; (2) The tendency to
condemn, not because he is believed guilty of the present charge, but because

he has escaped imprisonment from other offenses; both of these represent
the principle of Undue Prejudice; (3) The injustice of attacking one necessarily unprepared to demonstate that the attacking evidence is fabricated; this
represents the principle of Unfair Surprise." 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 194 at
650 (3d ed. 1940).
4. "The jury was entitled to consider the evidence of the bank robbery,
which, with the other evidence in the case, tended to establish the motive
for the car theft and murder which accompanied it." State v. Long, 195
Ore. 81, 244 P.2d 1033, 1049 (1952) (emphasis added).
5. "The fact that appellant deliberately pursued and shot Hazel immediately
after he shot Dora tends to show that his shooting of Dora was not, as he
claimed it was, an accident in an attempt at self-defense against William,
but was done with deliberate intent . . . ." Copeland v. United States, 152
F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (emphasis added).
6. "It must appear to be obvious that evidence of similar conduct of the
defendant, at least immediately prior to the commission of the offense
charged, was relevant to rebut her testimony that she stumbled upon the
purse by accident." People v. Williams, 6 Cal.2d 500, P.2d 917, 918 (1936)
(emphasis added).
7. "In its tendency to show that the man in the 'white T-shirt' who accosted
these children was m fact the defendant, the evidence was relevant to the
issue of identity . . . ." People v. McMonigle, 29 Cal.2d 730, 177 P.2d 745,
753 (1947) (emphasis added).
8. "[Elvidence of the conduct of taking indecent liberties with other
children than the prosecutrix, at defendant's own house, in almost exactly.
the same manner, constituted evidence admissible as an exception to the
general rule ...." State v. De Pauw, 246 Minn. 91, 74 N.W.2d 297, 300 (1955).
9. 2 WiommoP, EVIDENCE § 300 (3d ed. 1940).
10. Ibid.
11. Id. § 304.
12. For a discussion of cases wherein the courts have admitted evidence
based on similarities under a subterfuge of the plan or scheme principle,
but where the evidence actually fell into one of the other exceptions, see
State v. Goebel, 40 Wash.2d 18, 240 P.2d 251, 253 (1952), which refused to
admit evidence of prior bad acts to establish a plan or scheme merely because they were similar to the crime charged. Contra, People v. Sullivan,
101 Cal. App.2d 322, 225 P.2d 645 (1950).
13. Gossett v. State, 203 Ga. App. 692, 48 S.E.2d 71 (1948).
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intent 14 and identity.15 In admitting evidence under the exceptions,
the courts are generally aware of the reasons for the general exclusionary rule and have relied on the discretion of the trial judge in
6
applying them.
The court in the instant case found that the evidence of the prior
rape presented such cogent similarities to the crime charged that
the testimony concerning the prior rape was admissible under the
plan or scheme exception.' 7 The determination that there was a plan
or scheme to commit rape was based on the court's finding that
the two crimes were characterized by similar incidents consonant
with a sinister design.' 8 The dissent was of the opinion that because
of the lack of characterizing similarities the two crimes did not
establish a plan or scheme to commit rape and that the plan or scheme
principle is predicated on the notion of deliberate behavior which
cannot be inferred from the proffered testimony. 19 The majority
opinion supported its admission of the evidence on the ground that
"the courts appear to be more liberal in admitting, as proof of his
guilt, evidence of similar sex offenses than when one is charged with
non-sex offenses. '20 (Emphasis added.) The court in sustaining
the trial court's admission of the evidence upheld an instruction
which in part limited the evidence to proof of defendant's lascivious
disposition.21
The court's decision, on the basis of one prior act, that the crime
charged was a manifestation of a scheme or plan to commit rape is
14. Copeland v. United States, 152 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
15. State v. Goebel, 40 Wash. 2d 18, 240 P.2d 251 (1952).
16. King v. United States, 144 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1944); Neff v. United
States, 105 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1939); State v. Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 39 N.W.2d
887 (1949).
17. The court found a scheme or plan to commit rape from the following
factors present in both crimes: (1) Both crimes were committed in a car,
late at night; (2) in both crimes defendent announced his intention regardless
of the women's consent; (3) there was a ripping off of clothes proceeding
with brute force to accomplish his act; (4) both victims testified as to a
Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde transformation in the defendant, in that he appeared
normal until they refused to submit, whereupon he acted like a madman. 338
P.2d at 795.
18. The court reasoned that the similar incidents in both crimes as outlined
in note 17 supra were a manifestation of a sinister design by defendant.
This reasoning seems to be based on a conclusion that the aforementioned
incidents are so unique to a commission of rape that they could be the basis
for establishing a course of conduct characterized by a bent mind.
19. 338 P.2d at 799.
20. The court's holding that more liberality is allowed in permitting this
evidence in cases involving sex crimes is substantiated by judicial authority:
State v. Whiting, 173 Kan. 711, 252 P.2d 884 (1953); Dorsey v. State, 204
Ga. 345, 49 S.E.2d 886 (1948). However, this sanctioned liberality has not
been extended to admit the evidence for the purpose of proving guilt; the
admission of the evidence in the cases cited is limited to the proof of one
of the exceptions to the general rule.
21. This dictum is not in accord with the judicial authorities. In some sex
6rimes, the evidence will be admitted to prove defendant's disposition where
the witness was also the prosecutrix. Kohlberg v. Gray, 207 F.2d 35 (D.C.
Cir. 1953).
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a very liberal holding. A scheme or plan is established by evidence
evincing a general course of conduct on the part of the defendant.
Wigmore points out that where other circumstances are present a
plan or scheme to commit rape may be indicated by a single previous
act. 22 The similarities of the two acts that the court in the instant
case uses to establish a plan or scheme, however, are incidents usual
to any rape and do not appear to be sufficiently unique to establish
a general pattern of human behavior. The issue involved in the
principal case was consent, and as stated by the dissent, "the fact
alone that one woman was raped has no tendency to prove that
another woman did not consent."' 2 It is submitted that since the act
of intercourse was admitted by the defendant in the instant case
no basis is established for the admissibility of the evidence for it does
not appear to evince a plan or scheme.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE-REMOVAL TO
FEDERAL COURT-DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO REMOVE WHEN
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS COGNIZABLE ONLY IN
FEDERAL COURT
A labor union brought proceedings against an employer in a state
1
court to confirm an arbitration award. The defendant removed the
matter to the federal district court, claiming federal question jurisdiction under section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947,2 although the plaintiff's initial pleading had not alleged the
status of the union as "representing employees in an industry affecting
3
commerce." The plaintiff moved to remand. Held, motion denied.
Since section 301 (a) of the LIRA pre-empts state causes of action
22. "Nevertheless, a single previous act, even upon another woman, may,
with other circumstances give strong indication of a design (not a disposition)
to rape .

. . ."

2 WIGMORm, EVIDENCE § 357 at 267 (3d ed. 1940).

23. 338 P.2d at 798.
1. "Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a) (1952).
2. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties." 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1952).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1952). This section guarantees a plaintiff the
right to remand to the state court cases improperly removed by the defendant.
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for breach of collective bargaining agreements, the source of plaintiff's right is federal law exclusively and therefore the court may
look to the removal petition to establish that fact. Minkoff v. Scranton
Frocks, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Beginning with the landmark case of Tennessee v. Union & Planters'
Bank,4 which was later amplified by Gully v. First Nat'l Bank,5
numerous decisions have held that the presence of a federal question
authorizing removal of a suit in a state court to a federal court must
be disclosed by the plaintiff's declaration unaided by defendant's
petition for removal. 6 The rule is based on the idea that the plaintiff
should have final choice of the law upon which he rests his cause of
action.7 Plaintiff's discretion is restricted, nevertheless, in that the
federal question may be ascertained from the removal petition if the
plaintiff mistakenly or fraudulently conceals the federal question.
Likewise, where federal jurisdiction results from the particular status
of the parties, or of one of them, some decisions have allowed determination of that status to be derived from the removal petition.
Judicial interpretation of section 301 (a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 194710 as a pre-emption by the federal government
of actions involving labor unions "representing employees in an industry affecting commerce"" has laid the groundwork for federal
courts to justify their further encroachment upon the time-honored
rule prohibiting the use of defendant's removal petition to determine
the federal question.12
4. 152 U.S. 454 (1894).

5. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
6. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912); Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d
962 (9th Cir. 1950); Armstrong v. Alliance Trust Co., 126 F.2d 164 (5th Cir.
1942); Pocahontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council,
93 F. Supp. 217 (D. Me. 1950); International Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 92 F. Supp. 674 (D. Md. 1950).

7. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913); MooRE,

CODE 228-29 (1949).
8. Winters v. Drake, 102 Fed. 545 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1900).
9. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cody, 166 U.S. 606 (1897) (a corporation);
Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U.S. 102, 107 (1894) (diversity of citizenship);
Winters v. Drake, supra note 8 (federal nature of a receiver); Wood v.
Drake, 70 Fed. 881 (C.C.S.D. Wash. 1895) (a federal marshal).
JUDICIAL

10. Quoted supra note 1.

11. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); ShirleyHerman Co. v. International Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1950); McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49
Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). Contra,
Associated Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, CIO, 114 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.
Cal. 1953); Castle & Cooke Terminals Limited v. Local 137, Int'l Longshoremen's Union, 110 F. Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953) (placing great stress on the
words "may be brought" in § 301 (a) ). See also, Mendelsohn, Enforceability
of Arbitration Agreement Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE L. J.
167 (1956); Note, 72 HARv. L. REv. 354 (1958); 71 HARV. L. REv. 1172, 1174
(1958). These articles give an excellent discussion of federal pre-emption
and its consequences under § 301(a).
12. Ingraham Co. v. Local 260, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 171 F. Supp.

103 (D. Conn. 1959); Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp.
278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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3
Whereas Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, arising under section 301 (a), justified inspection of the defendant's removal petition
on the "status of the parties" theory,14 the instant case adopts a new
basis for such action, holding that there is such justification where
the plaintiff's right to relief is based exclusively on federal law5
there being no grounds for relief under state law.' The court is
careful to point out that section 301 (a) does not, however, eliminate
state court jurisdiction. 16 Therefore, the requirement that the state
court have original jurisdiction7 as a condition precedent to removal
is fulfilled. It is the exclusiveness of the right's source as federal
upon which the court justifies its position here, for the established
principle of the Gully' 8 case is recognized by it. 19 The court reasons
that preventing the use of the defendant's removal petition to establish
the federal question would allow the plaintiff to "artfully defeat the
right of the defendant to have the cause determined in a federal

forum.

' 20

The decision rests on a balancing of respective rights-

plaintiff's right to choose the basis of his cause of action against defendant's right to a federal forum-with the result favoring the
defendant.
13. 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
14. Id. at 280. The "status of the parties" theory is a concept stating that
where federal jurisdiction hinges on the parties, or one of them, having a
particular status, the court may look outside the complaint to determine
that status.
15. '"W7hen the petition for removal shows that the right to relief is exclusively federal, it is permissible to look to the petition to establish that
fact." 172 F. Supp. at 873.
16. "The jurisdiction conferred by Section 301 upon the federal courts
is not exclusive. The state courts must, of course, in determining the controversy, apply federal law." 172 F. Supp. at 877. A contrasting view may
be found in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623, 629 & n.16 (3d Cir. 1954): "On the question whether
Section 301 has made the federal courts the exclusive forum to determine
cases involving collective bargaining contracts between employers and labor
organizations representing employees in an industry affecting commerce, it
is significant that in the tort section of the Labor Management Relations
Act, Section 303, in the jurisdictional grant, Congress said that the party injured by the proscribed conduct 'may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States ... or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties
...' (Emphasis added) § 303(b). There is no such choice of forums under
Section 301, seemingly indicating that Congress intended to pre-empt to the
federal courts litigation on collective bargaining contracts."
17. "[J]urisdiction of the federal court on removal is, in a limited sense,
a derivative jurisdiction. Where the state court lacks jurisdiction of the
subject matter or of the parties, the federal court acquires none, although in
a like suit originally brought in a federal court it would have had jurisdiction." Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939).
18. "[T]he controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint,
unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal." Gully v. First Nat'l
Bank, supra note 5, at 113.
19. "Where the plaintiff has a right to relief, either under federal law, or
under state law as an independent source of that right, it may be that
the federal court, on removal, may not look beyond the face of the initial
pleading in the state action to determine whether a federal question is presented." 172 F. Supp. at 873. The court cites Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, supra
note 5, for this proposition.
20. Id. at 873.
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An essential element of the Gully doctrine on removal is the existence of a state cause of action which thereby makes possible a
selection by the plaintiff of the cause of action (state or federal)
upon which he will rest his case. To agree with the Supreme Court
that section 301 (a) has pre-empted state causes of action is therefore
to remove the plaintiff's case from the scope of the Gully doctrine.
Since plaintiff's right to select his cause of action has been eliminated
by pre-emption, it seems only just that the defendant's right to be
heard in a federal forum not be impaired by a failure of the plaintiff
to allege the grounds for federal jurisdiction in his complaint. To
allow the plaintiff to stand on a nonexistent state right would force
the defendant to resort to a defense of federal pre-emption with the
inherent danger of having to run the gamut of appellate procedure in
order to achieve trial in the federal tribunal. Where it is clear that
federal pre-emption of plaintiff's asserted state cause of action has
occurred, 21 as in the instant case, the right to look to the defendant's
removal petition at the outset of the case to determine the existence
of a federal question is both just and in accord with the principles
of expediting litigation. It is to be expected that courts in many
cases will have difficulty in determining when federal pre-emption
has occurred, particularly where Congress has failed to specifically
forbid state action. However, the difficulty of determining this matter
in some cases should not operate to deny the defendant his right to a
federal forum in clear cases of federal pre-emption.

FEDERAL RULES CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CONTEMPTPOWER OF FEDERAL COURT TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT
UNDER RULE 42(a)
Defendant, a witness in a grand jury investigation of violations of
the Motor Carrier Act,' refused to answer certain questions on
grounds of possible self-incrimination. The federal district court
ruled that the act afforded defendant immunity from subsequent criminal prosecution,2 and ordered him to testify. After returning to the
21. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).

The

Supreme Court in this case held that § 301(a) pre-empted state causes of
action in this area.
1. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1953).
2. The immunity provision of part I of the Interstate Commerce Act
provides that "no person shall be prosecuted . .. for or on account of any
... thing, concerning which he may testify... before said Commission....
27 Stat. 444 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1954). The district court ruled that this
immunity was incorporated into the Motor Carrier Act (part II of the
Interstate Commerce Act), which provides that "any person ... testifying in
connection with any matter under investigation under this part shall have
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grand jury room, defendant again refused to answer, whereupon he
was once more removed to the court room and the grand jury questions were repeated by the judge. Upon his continued refusal to
answer, defendant was summarily convicted of contempt under rule
42 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3 and sentenced to
serve fifteen months in a federal penitentiary.4 The court of appeals
affirmed. 5 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
held (five-to-four), affirmed. A refusal to answer questions in a grand
jury investigation, followed by a similar refusal in a court room proceeding ancillary to that investigation, constitutes one continuing
contempt and is a contempt committed "in the actual presence of the
court" within the meaning of rule 42(a). Brown v. United States,
359 U.S. 41 (1959).
Judicial abuse of the common law power to punish contempt by
summary process 6 led the Supreme Court to hold in Cooke v. United
States7 that contempts occurring outside of open court could not be
punished without notice and opportunity to defend. Prior to this
decision Congress had attempted to curb the summary power,8 but
the prevailing judicial construction rendered the statute meaningless; 9
and even when construed literally, it was held to permit summary
punishment of conduct not witnessed by the judge.10 There was a
the same rights, privileges, and immunities .. .as though such matter arose
under part I .

. . ."

49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 305(d) (1953).

3. "(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished
summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of
the court." FED. R. Canvi. P. 42(a). Section (b) of this rule provides for
notice and opportunity to defend in all contempt cases not covered by § (a).
4. Mr. Justice Warren characterized this as "apparently . . . the longest

contempt sentence ever sustained by any appellate court in the federal
system for a refusal to answer questions of a court or grand jury." Brown
v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 58-59 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
5. United States v. Brown, 247 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1957).
6. The summary power has a relatively short common law history. "[U]ntil
1720 there is no instance in the common-law precedents of punishment
otherwise than after trial in the ordinary course and not by summary
process." Frankfurter, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
HARv.L. REV. 1010, 1046 (1924). For a scholarly treatment of the development
of the summary power see Fox, The King v. Almon, 24 L. Q. REV. 266 (1908).
7. 267 U.S. 517 (1925). The principles set forth in this opinion appeared
as dicta over thirty-five years earlier in Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267, 277
(1889), and were apparently well established at common law. See 4 BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTAIES* 286.
8. "[T]he power of the several courts of the United States to . . . inflict

summary punishments for contempts of court shall not be construed to extend
to any cases except the misbehavior of any person... in the presence of the
court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice ..
Act of March 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487.
9. "[T]here can be no doubt that the provision ... imposed no limitations
not already existing." Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402,
418 (1918).
10. Prior to the holding in the Toledo Newspaper case the statute was
construed as limiting the summary power to the punishment of contempts
committed in the general vicinity of the court room. Even under this con-
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need to confine this power to the court room because, in the first place,
judges could not exercise it justly unless they had personal knowledge of the contempt," and in the second place, only court room
contempts degraded the court's authority in such a way as to require
immediate discipline.'2 Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
13
Procedure is virtually an adoption of the holding in the Cooke case.
Convictions of grand jury witnesses under the summary provision of
this rule have been fairly common. Where a defendant defies a
court's order to return to the grand jury room to testify, he has clearly
committed contempt "in the actual presence of the court," and Rule
42 (a) may be applied. 14 The problems arise where the defendant's
only open court "contempt" has been his refusal to answer a court
room repetition of grand jury questioning. In these latter cases the
convictions have not been upheld unless, as in the instant case, the
witness had previously committed contempt in the grand jury room
by refusing to answer when under court order to do so.' 5 Where such
previous contempt had occurred, there was, prior to the decision in
the instant case, a split of authority as to whether rule 42 (a) could
16
be applied.
In affirming defendant's conviction the majority opinion stressed
the historic function of the court as the enforcing arm of grand jury
proceedings and noted that previous Supreme Court decisions 17 have
given sub silentio approval to the carrying out of that function by
means of summary contempt proceedings. The Court apparently
found no technical difficulty in the application of rule 42 (a) to the
facts of this case. It conceded that defendant's contempt in the
grand jury room-since it did not occur in the presence of the court
-could have been punished only under rule 42 (b).18 However, the
struction, however, the contempt need not have occurred within the court
room itself. Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267, 276-77 (1889); Ex Parte Robinson,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 511 (1873) (semble). This construction was later
revived in Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
11. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925).
12. Ibid.
13. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13-14 (1954).
14. Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209, 216 (1st Cir. 1954) (dictum);
Enrichi v. United States, 212 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1954) (semble).
15. In the following cases the defendant had not been ordered to return
to the grand jury room, and the convictions were reversed: Wong Gim Ying
v. United States, 231 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Carlson v. United States, 209
F.2d 209 (1st Cir. 1954); Hooley v. United States, 209 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1954).
16. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1950) (conviction affirmed
without comment as to use of summary process); United States v. Curcio,
234 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1956) (conviction affirmed); Carlson v. United States,
209 F.2d 209, 216 (1st Cir. 1954) (dictum to effect that summary process
may not be invoked).
17. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1950); Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361 (1911) (semble).
18. On this point the majority and dissenting opinions are in agreement.
However, the position of the dissenting opinion is that the district court had
only two alternatives after defendant committed contempt in the grand jury
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Court held that when defendant "continued" his contempt 19 by refusing to answer in the court room, there was contempt in the actual
presence of the court, and rule 42(a) became applicable.
As a result of this holding, rule 42 (b) may become a dead letter
insofar as its application to the withholding of grand jury testimony
is concerned. However, this should not cause any great alarm. As
noted above, the main reason for limiting the summary power is to
prevent judges from determining factual issues concerning conduct
which they have not personally observed. In cases where a grand
jury witness refuses to testify, the only relevant fact which could
2
be obtained by judicial observation is that the refusal occurred.
Since this fact is easily established, usually through defendant's
own admission, there does not seem to be any reason for treating
these contempts differently from contempts committed in open court.
There is no doubt that the summary process of rule 42 (a) is applicable in cases where the defendant defies the court's order to
return to the grand jury room and testify.21 To say that it becomes
inapplicable simply because the defendant waits until he is beyond
the reach of the court before he disobeys its order, is to make a
technical distinction between situations which are identical in practical effect. Circumvention of this distinction by methods such as
those employed in the instant case does not appear to work any
great injustice. It is arguable that defendants should be accorded
the protection of rule 42(b) in all contempt cases.22 Once summary
punishment is accepted in principle, however, there seems to be no
reason for prohibiting its application to this particular class of cases.
The Court clearly limited its holding to cases involving no "factual
issues as to the nature of defendant's conduct 23 . ... ." So long as subroom: it could commit him to jail for civil contempt, or it could commence
criminal proceedings under rule 42(b). The dissenting Justices denied the
power of the court to subject defendant to the terms of rule 42(a) by
compelling him to repeat his contempt in a "command performance" before
the court. 359 U.S. at 54.
19. Such "continuing contempts" have been held to have occurred where
there was a series of refusals to answer questions during the course of a
single trial. Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 74 (1957). However, there
is also authority for the proposition that a contempt is "total" the instant
it is uttered, and that subsequent repetitions "can not be considered as anything more than expressions of [defendant's] . . . intention to adhere to his

earlier statement .... " United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 204 (1952). The
dissenting opinion in the instant case, apparently adopting this latter
interpretation, argued that defendant's court room conduct was not a
second contempt and, therefore, it could not be punished. 359 U.S. at 54.
20. Other facts amounting to a defense or tending to mitigate defendant's
refusal to testify would necessarily be beyond the scope of judicial observation whether the contempt occurred in court or out of court.
21. Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209, 216 (1st Cir. 1954) (dictum).

22. Three of the four Justices who dissented in the instant case had
previously advocated the complete abolition of summary procedure in
contempt cases. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
23. 359 U.S. at 48.
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sequent decisions remain within this limitation, there is no reason to
suppose that rule 42(b) will fail to provide the sort of protection it
was intended to provide.

FEDERAL RULES CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-GRAND JURY
PROCEEDINGS-DEFENDANT HAS NO ABSOLUTE RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO GRAND JURY MINUTES
The petitioners were convicted in a federal district court of a
conspiracy violation under section 1 of the Sherman Act.' The trial
judge denied the petitioners' request for permission to inspect the
minutes covering the grand jury testimony of a key government
witness 2 at the trial. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which held that under rule 6(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure3 the question of inspection
of grand jury minutes was committed to the sound discretion of the
trial judge and no abuse of that discretion was shown. 4 On certiorari, to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed
(five-to-four decision). Absent proof of the existence of a particularized need for grand jury minutes, which need outweighs the policy
of secrecy, there is no absolute right to disclosure of the transcript
of such minutes merely because it includes subject matter generally
covered at the trial. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360
U.S. 395 (1959).
At common law grand jury proceedings were held in absolute
secrecy in order to insure a fair and effective investigative procedure
to determine if sufficient reasons existed for bringing to trial a person
accused of crime. 5 The federal courts have adhered to this policy
while the grand jury is in session and generally have applied a
rule of nondisclosure to the minutes of these proceedings after the
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
2. The indictment charged a conspiracy to fix the price of mirrors sold in
interstate commerce. The evidence indicated that the conspiracy resulted
from two meetings of representatives of mirror manufacturing interests.
While the key government witness was the only one characterizing the result of the meetings as an "agreement" on prices, no witness contradicted
this conclusion and identical price lists were issued following the meeting.
It was established that the key witness had testified before the grand jury
three times on the same general subject matter. In order to impeach this
witness, the petitioners requested portions of the grand jury minutes.
3. FED. R. Cmlv. P. 6 (e).
4. 260 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1958).
5. See 8 WIGmORE, EVmENC § 2360-63 (3d ed. 1940) for a history of the
grand jury at common law, the extent of the secrecy rule, and the weaknesses of this rule. See also Kaufman, The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its
Powers, 17 F.R.D. 331 (1955).
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grand jury's discharge. 6 Under the Federal Rules of Criminal* Procedure,7 grand jury minutes may be released to government attorneys,
but disclosure to the defendant may be made only on the. direction
8
of the trial judge, a practice upheld by the Courts of Appeals and
the Supreme Court.9 Where the defense establishes a "particularized
need" for grand jury minutes to impeach a witness, limited relaxation
of the secrecy rule is allowed.' 0 Normally the defense petitions the
6. "The reasons which lie behind the requirement of secrecy may be
summarized as follows: (1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand
jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject-to indictment or their
friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of
perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before the grand
jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage
free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with
respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect the innocent accused
who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no
probability of guilt." United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55
F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931). See also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,
362 (1956); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943); United States
v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 627-28 (3d Cir. 1954).
7. Section 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

"Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its
deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys
for the government for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise
a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing
that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because
of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may
be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule. The
court may direct that an indictment shall be kept secret until the
defendant is in custody or has given bail, and in that event the clerk
shall seal the indictment and no person shall disclose the finding of
the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and execution of
a warrant or summons."
8. E.g. Parr v. United States, 265 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v.
Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Angelet, 255 F.2d
383 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954);
Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940). The Parr, Spangelet
and Angelet cases were decided after Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657
(1957), discussed at note 12 infra, and also after the enactment of the Jencks
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. V, 1958), discussed at note 14 infra. In these
three cases the Jencks decision and statute were held inapplicable to grand
jury minutes.
9. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See also
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co. 356 U.S. 677 (1958), a civil action in
which the government based its case upon the minutes of a grand jury proceeding in which the defendants were investigated for criminal offenses
but in which no indictment was returned. Referring to the "indispensable
secrecy" of grand jury proceedings, the Court distinguished cases involving
impeachment of witnesses and comparable "articularized need" where
secrecy is "discretely and limitedly" suspended. In effect, the Court concluded that the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing disclosure where
there was no compelling necessity for widespread discovery. Id. at 683. For
a discussion of a possible intent by the Court to apply the rationale of the
Jencks decision to the inspection of grand jury minutes in Procter & Gamble,
see Note, A Reexamination of the Rule of Secrecy of Grand Jury Minutes in
the Federal Courts, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 606, 615 n.53 (1959).
10. United States v. Procter & Gamble, note 9 supra; United States v. H.J.K.
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court to examine in camera the grand jury minutes covering the
testimony of the witness in question and deliver to the defense any
material that is contradictory and of impeachment value.11 There was
some speculation after the decision of the Supreme Court in Jencks
v. United States12 whether the frontiers of a defendant's right of
access to grand jury minutes had been expanded. Although a subsequent third circuit decision applied the Jencks rationale to grand
jury minutes,13 Congress shortly thereafter enacted the so-called
14
Jencks statute, designed to restrict the impact of the Jencks holding.
Theatre Corp. 236 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1956). "Particularized need" is a vague

expression which apparently no court has clearly defined. Examples of the
other kinds of "particularized needs" sufficient to allow disclosure of grand
jury minutes are: a perjury action based on a defendant's teqtimonv before
a grand jury, United States v. White, 104 F. Supp. 120 (DN.J. 1952); an
indictment allegedly the result of fraud, caprice or unfair judgment, United
States v. Gouled, 253 Fed. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (dictum).
11. If the defense objects to the withholding of any material by the court,
the entire grand jury testimony of the witness is sealed and attached to
the record on appeal. This procedure has been applied to other types of
government records as well as grand jury minutes, as indicated by the following cases from the second circuit, where it is most widely employed:
United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948) (SEC records); United
States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) (OPA records); United
States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944) (FBI renorts); United
States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 799 (1944)
(FBI reports and grand jury minutes); United States v. Krulewitch, 145
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944) (FBI reports). All of the authorities cited in this footnote were disapproved by the Supreme Court in the Jencks decision: "We
hold, further that the petitioner is entitled to inspect the reports to decide
whether to use them in his defense. Because only the defense is adequately
equipped to determine the effective use for purpose of discrediting the
Government's witness and thereby furthering the accused's defense, the
defense must initially be entitled to see them to determine what use may
be made of them. Justice requires no less.
"The practice of producing government documents to the trial judge for
his determination of relevancy and materiality, without hearing the accused
is disapproved." 353 U.S. at 668-69 & n.15.
12. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). The defendant, a union president indicted for
falsely swearing about communist affiliations, requested specific FBI reports
covering previous statements made by two prosecution witnesses. Mr.
Justice Brennan, delivering the opinion, proclaimed that the defendant had
a right to inspect all government reports touching upon the activities and
events to which the witnesses under question testified at the trial without
a prior showing of inconsistency. In lieu of permitting such inspection the
prosecution had the option of dismissing the action. An in camera inspection
by the court was held not to satisfy the defendant's right to determine the
relevancy of the material to the defense, although the court would rule
on the admissibility of such material as evidence. Id. at 668-72.
13. United States v. Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. V, 1958). For a discussion of the widespread
reaction to the Jencks decision during the three-month interval between the
decision and this legislation, see Comment, The Jencks Legislation: Problems
in Prospect, 67 YALE L. J. 674 (1958). See also 12 VAND. L. Rsv. 939
(1959). The Senate Judiciary Committee reported that the purpose of this
legislation was not to restrict or nullify the Jencks decision in so far as the
right of an accused to due process of law was concerned, but to prohibit
"fishing expeditions" into government documents. "The committee rejects,
therefore, any interpretations of the Jencks decision which would provide
for the production of entire investigative files, grand jury testimony, or
similar materials." S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), 2 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEws 1862. Preventing the use by defendants of FBI reports and
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This legislation, however, did not apply to grand jury minutes; 5 but
later a district court rejected the argument that the Jencks decision,
apart from the statute, affirmed the right of an accused to utilize
grand jury minutes for impeachment purposes without a prior court
inspection of the transcript. 16
Generally, before grand jury minutes will be released to defendants,
the federal courts have insisted on two prerequisites: there must be
a request by the defendant for an in camera inspection by the court
and a "particularized need" for the requested minutes must be
shown. In the instant case, the petitioners did not expressly request
an in camera inspection, but instead claimed an absolute right to disclosure of a portion of the transcript. This claim of right was
grounded on Jencks v. United States,1 7 but the Court specifically

refused to apply the rationale of that case to grand jury minutes.
Therefore Jencks has no effect on the requirements which a defendant
must satisfy prior to the disclosure of grand jury minutes. Since
this is so, the asserted claim of absolute right by the petitioners in
the instant case does not meet the first prerequisite, although the
dissent thought it implied a request for an in camera inspection by
the trial judge.18 There was then no necessity to resolve the troublesimilar government records for purposes other than impeachment of witnesses,
the statute provides for in camera inspection of the requested documents by

the court, similar to the Second Circuit procedure previously mentioned.
"[U]nder the proposed legislation, the trial judge shall examine the material
in chambers and will decide what portions of the material are competent
and relevant and shall, at the same time, excise the portions of the statement
which do not relate to the testimony of the witness at the trial." Id. at 1864.
The committee criticized Rosenberg as a misinterpretation of Jencks in its
application to grand jury minutes.
15. The grand jury is a branch of the judiciary, Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323 (1940); grand jurors are officers of the court, United States v.
Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1952). The Jencks statute, covering
only records of statements made to government agents, excludes, therefore,
grand jury minutes since grand jurors, as officers of the judiciary, are not
considered government agents.
16. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958). The court held in this case that the intent of Congress was to
exclude the application of the Jencks case to grand jury minutes, as evidenced
by the committee report and the definition of the word "statement" in the
Jencks statute. Although the argument that the Jencks holding alone, disregarding the statute, expresses a standard of fairness applicable to grand
jury minutes was tagged as alluring, it was rejected for the following reasons:
(1) the Supreme Court would have expressly referred to grand jury minutes
in the Jencks decision if there had been an intent to include them; (2) the
court distinguished between FBI reports and grand jury minutes because of
compelling reasons for secrecy of the latter. The court did not mention
that United States v. Cohen, supra note 11, which dealt with both FBI
reports and grand jury minutes, was one of the five cases disapproved in the
Jencks decision. See note 12 supra. In United States v. Spangelet, supra
note 8, the argument that the Jencks statute is unconstitutional because it
narrows the Jencks holding so as to exclude grand jury minutes, was rejected by the court, which found no indication in Jencks that the standards set
forth therein were constitutionally required.
17. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
18. 360 U.S. at 402.
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some question as to what constitutes "particularized need." The
court did state, however, that a defendant need not show a contradiction between the grand jury and trial testimony to satisfy the
latter requirement.' 9 What he must show to prove a "particularized
need" remains unclear,2 0 and future cases will probably have to be
handled on an ad hoc basis. The reasons 21 behind the policy of secrecy
in respect to grand jury minutes, although mentioned, were not
reexamined; and the Court apparently finds them quite satisfactory
at this time.
Although the present decision is consistent with traditional expressions of policy with respect to secrecy of grand jury proceedings
in the federal court system, it does invite attention to the need for
reexamination of this policy. After a prosecution witness has testified,
there appears to be little justifiable purpose in withholding from the
defense the grand jury testimony of that witness on the same subject matter.22 To require of the defense a showing of "particularized
need" for this material gives the prosecution an unfair tactical
advantage. In addition the in camera inspection procedure, insisted
upon by this decision, is prejudicial to the defense as was pointed out
19. Id. at 401.
20. The Court emphasized that there was overwhelming proof of the conspiracy aside from the testimony of the key witness. Id. at 398. This raises
the possible inference that in order to establish a "particularized need"
the defense would have the burden of showing or tending to show that
sufficient prior evidence for conviction had not been presented, However,
the Court probably did not intend to infer that. In a petition to the Supreme
Court for a rehearing of this case filed by Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., the
conclusion that proof of the conspiracy was overwhelming, even if the
testimony of the key witness is disregarded, was attacked as inapplicable to
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. Petition for Rehearing, Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959). Rehearing, however, was denied.
28 U.S.L. WEEK 3111 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1959).
21. 360 U.S. at 399. The Court here referred to the reasons listed Supra,
note 6. The dissent set forth substantially the same reasons but found "none
of these reasons dictates that [the witness'] . . . testimony, to the limited

extent it is sought, should be kept secret. The Court, while making obeisance
to a 'long-established policy' of secrecy, makes no showing whatever how
denial of [the witness'] ... grand jury testimony serves any of the purposes
justifying secrecy." Id. at 406. Each reason was then examined and shown
to be inapplicable to the instant case. Wigmore's reasons for encouraging
a more limited and less rigid application of the grand jury secrecy rule
were cited in the dissenting opinion. WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5. The
dissent also noted: "Grand jury secrecy is maintained to serve particular
ends. But when... the advantages gained by secrecy are outweighed by a
countervailing interest in disclosure, secrecy may and should be lifted, for
to do so in such a circumstance would further the fair administration of
criminal justice." 360 U.S. at 403. Mr. Justice Brennan, who wrote the
dissent, found that the reasons he expressed in Jencks for finding the in
camera inspection procedure unfair to defendants are equally applicable in
the instant case. See quotation from Jencks, supra note 11.
22. One such purpose might be to protect from disclosure the names of
persons to whom reference was made in grand jury testimony but who have
not been called as trial witnesses. If the grand jury minutes to be disclosed
to the defense contains such references, it would seem that the court could
direct that they be deleted before the minutes are released, if such procedure does not prejudice the defense.
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in the Jencks decision with respect to documents other than grand
jury minutes,2 3 but neither Jencks nor the instant holding was
decided upon constitutional grounds.24 If the in camera inspection
procedure is to remain the sole avenue to grand jury minutes for
defendants, the "particularized need" requirement needs to be relaxed
and more clearly defined. It is submitted, however, that in the
absence of compelling purposes to be served by secrecy, defendants
should have a right to inspect prior to cross-examination the grand
jury minutes covering the testimony of prosecution witnesses on the
same subject matter on which they have testified at the trial.

INSURANCE-LOSS SHARED EQUALLY WHERE THERE ARE
CONFLICTING "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES
As a result of its negligent operation of a leased truck, lessee
became liable to another. Insurance company A had issued lessee
a liability policy which provided that if other valid and collectible1
insurance existed against a given loss its policy was to be treated as
"excess" insurance. Lessee was also insured under the "omnibus"
clause of lessor's liability policy issued by company B. The "other
insurance" clause of B's policy provided that if other valid and
collectible insurance existed, recovery on B's policy would be limited
to the proportion of the loss that the policy's applicable limit of
liability bore to the total applicable limit of all valid and collectible
insurance (a "pro rata" clause). On B's refusal to recognize liability
on its policy, lessee secured a loan through A and settled the claim of
the injured party. Lessee and A then brought suit to recover the
full amount of the claim from B. Each insurer contended that the
other was primarily liable for the loss. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Oregon, from a judgment for plaintiffs, held decree modified
23. See quotation from Jencks, supra note 11.
24. Although the in camera procedure might be attacked as depriving a

defendant of due process under the fifth amendment of the federal constitution, it is doubtful if this contention could be sustained under the present

meaning of the due process clause. Another attack on the constitutionality of
this procedure could be based on the right of a defendant to confront
witnesses under the sixth amendment. It might be argued that the defendant is deprived of this right unless he has the same opportunity as the prosecution for access to grand jury minutes as a tool to use in the cross examination of witnesses. It is also doubtful if the Court is ready to accept this contention.

1. The requirement of validity eliminates policies which are considered
wagering contracts or other illegal agreements, while the requirement of
collectibility prevents the insured being denied recovery when he is insured
with another company which is insolvent or bankrupt.
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and affirmed.2 Where a loss is covered by policies of insurance containing conflicting "other insurance" clauses, these clauses will be
disregarded and the insurers will share the loss equally. LambWeston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 341 P.2d 110 (Ore. 1959).
Despite able attempts by writers to harmonize the theories and
3
results of the cases dealing with conflicting "other insurance" clauses,
4
in the final analysis "these decisions point in all directions." Until
1952 the courts had resolved the issue by considering one insurer
primarily, and the other secondarily, liable, usually on one of the
following bases: (1) The issue date of the policies, the first issuer
being held primarily liable; 5 (2) Specificity in the policies' inclusion
or exclusion of the party claiming coverage; 6 (3) Specificity in inclusion or exclusion of the particular risk out of which the loss arose.7
Following the leading case of Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co.,8 decided in 1952, courts have tended to renounce
the primary-liability approach and hold the insurers concurrently
liable. These holdings, however, disagree as to the proper basis for
allocation of the loss: At least one court used the rate of the
premiums paid; 9 some courts use the proportion of the limit of the
2. This holding, in effect, reversed the lower court's holding since the

latter had held defendant liable for the full amount of the loss, and this
court held plaintiff liable for one-half the amount of the loss.
3. 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4914 (1942); Smith, Other
Insurance Clauses of Liability Insurance Policies, 23 INs. COUNSEL J. 73

(1956); Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect of Double Coverage and
"Other Insurance" Clauses, 38 Mlum. L. REv. 838 (1954); 5 STAN. L. REV. 147

(1952).
4. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958,
959 (9th Cir. 1952).

5. Kearns Coal Corp. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 118 F.2d 33 (2d
Cir. 1941); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 108 F.2d
653 (6th Cir. 1940); Michigan Alkali Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 103 F.2d

345 (2d Cir. 1939); Gutner v. Switzerland Gen. Ins. Co., 32 F.2d 700 (2d Cir.
1929).
6.American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Penn Mut. Indem. Co., 161 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.
1947) (insurer naming tortfeasor held primarily liable); Fidelity & Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn. 227, 199 Atl. 93 (1938) (insurer pri-

marily liable on basis of specificity of inclusion); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v.

Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 190 Minn. 528, 252 N.W. 434 (1934) (policy most
specific in exclusion held secondary insurance); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Bankers
Indem. Ins. Co., 51 Ohio App. 323, 200 N.E. 849 (1935) (policy most specific in
inclusion held primary insurance).
7. General Ins. Co. of America v. Western Fire & Cas. Co., 241 F.2d 289
(5th Cir. 1957) (policy most specific in inclusion held primary insurance);
McFarland v. Chicago Exp., Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952) (policy most
specific in exclusion held secondary insurance); Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins.
Co.v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1941) (policy most specific in exclusion
held secondary insurance), 55 HARv. L. REv. 1218 (1942); Continental Cas.
Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 94 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1938) (policy most specific
in exclusion held secondary); Grasberger v. Liebert & Obert, Inc., 335 Pa.
491, 6 A.2d 925 (1939) (policy most specific in exclusion held secondary).
8.195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952). This case isnoted in 52 COLUM. L. REV.
1063 (1952); 26 So. CAL.L. REV. 331 (1953); 5 STAN. L. REV. 147 (1952).
9.Insurance Co. of Tex. v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 143
(S.D. Cal. 1958).
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policy to the total limit of all applicable insurance; 0 and others, the
number of policies covering the loss, thus allocating the loss equally
between the insurers.'"
The court in the instant case rejected the primary-insurer rationale
as circuitous, quoting Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. as follows: "[This] reasoning appears to us completely
circular, depending, as it were, on which policy one happens to read
first. . . . [C]ourts have seized upon some relatively arbitrary circumstances to decide which insurer must assume primary responsibility."' 2 In selecting another method of allocation, the court declined
to pro-rate the loss on the basis of policy limits for the reason that this
would necessitate a determination that the "pro rata" policy was
primary and therefore would involve the same circular reasoning
sought to be avoided.' 3 The court concluded that where "other insur4
ance" clauses conflict "each should be rejected in toto"' and the
loss should be shared equally, regardless of the disparity in the limits
of the policies.
In rejecting the primary-insurer theory and holding the insurers
concurrently liable, the court was supported by well-reasoned authorities;' 5 but the allocation formula selected seems as arbitrary as the
one rejected, and in addition raises unnecessary problems. For example, if the applicable limits of the policies are $5,000 and $50,000
and a loss of $25,000 occurs, will the insured be limited to a recovery
of $12,500 on the $50,000 policy, thereby leaving him only partially
indemnified? No good reason appears in the instant case why the
insurers should not bear the loss in the proportion of their respective
policy limits.' 6 The court refused to adopt the proration method of
allocation simply because such division would be incidentally giving
effect to the pro rata clause in one of the policies.' 7 This objection
lacks merit. As both parties contend throughout their briefs on plaintiff-respondent's petition for rehearing, this basis for sharing the loss
is most satisfactory to all concerned 18 and, as an equitable formula,
10. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958
(9th Cir. 1952); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 155 Cal.App.
2d 192, 318 P.2d 84 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Woodrich Constr. Co. v. Indemnity
Ins. Co., 252 Minn. 86, 89 N.W.2d 412, 43 MiN. L. REV. 153 (1958); Arditi v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 315 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. 1958).
11. Continental Cas. Co. v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 175
F. Supp. 713 (D. Ore. 1959) (quoting with approval the principal case);
Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 28 N.J. 554, 147 A.2d 529
(1959), 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 617 (1959) (disapproving court's reasoning).
12. 341 P.2d at 116, quoting 195 F.2d at 960.
13. 341 P.2d at 119.
14. Ibid.
15. Cases cited note 10 supra.
16. Company A's policy limited liability to $25,000 while company B's policy
limited liability to $5,000. Brief for Respondent on petition for rehearing,
p. 18, Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 341 P.2d 110 (Ore. 1959).
17. 341 P.2d at 119.
18. It is interesting to note that St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., company
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is in no wise dependant upon any of the policy clauses. This position
20
is supported by legal writers 19 as well as the best reasoned cases.
In view of these facts, the court should grant the rehearing and
modify its decision accordingly. 2 1

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-CARRIERS-RETROACTIVE
ADJUSTMENT FOR ALLEGED UNREASONABLE RATES
CHARGED BY INTERSTATE MOTOR CARRIERS
United States, as shipper, refused to make full payment on a bill for
shipments handled by two interstate motor carriers on the theory that
the carriers' published rates were unreasonably high. Each of the
carriers brought suit for the unpaid transportation charges.' In both
cases the government's contention that it could challenge the reasonableness of the motor carriers' published rate in post-shipment litigation was denied and summary judgments were granted to the carriers.
The respective courts of appeals reversed these judgments,2 holding that the allegations of unreasonableness constituted a good defense
and that the issue raised thereby should be referred to the Interstate
Commerce Commission for determination. On certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, (5-4) reversed. Under the
Motor Carrier Act, a shipper has no existing statutory right and no
surviving common law right to recover or resist, on the ground of
unreasonableness, past motor carrier charges made under applicable,
published rates and the I.C.C. ruling to the contrary in Bell Potato
A, who was plaintiff-respondent, under the court's present judgment is liable
for only one-half the loss and now seeks a ruling under which it will be liable

$25,000
for five-sixths (
) of the loss.
$25,000 + $5,000
19. Billings, The "Other Insurance" Provision of The Automobile Policy,
1949 INs. L. J. 498, 528; Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect of Double Coverage and "Other Insurance" Clauses, 38 MINN. L. Rsv. 838, 856 (1954);
43 MUINN. L. REv. 153 (1958); 26 So. CAL. L. REV. 331 (1953).
20. Cases cited note 10 supra.
21. In an undated opinion handed down in November 1959, and as yet unpublished, the court denied the petition to rehear, but modified its original
opinion to the extent that the insurers were held liable in the proportion of
their policies' limits. If this opinion on rehearing remains unpublished, the
original opinion is an inaccurate expression of the court's view as to the
proper basis of allocation. In the Cosmopolitan case, supra note 11, decided
prior to the rehearing decision, the federal court in Oregon followed the
original opinion in the instant case on the allocation point. The rule to be
followed in the future by the federal courts in Oregon is uncertain.
1. These suits were brought under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2)
(1952).
2. United States v. T.I.M.E., Inc., 252 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1958); United States
v. Davidson Transfer & Storage Co., 259 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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3
Chip Co. v. Aberdeen Truck Line is overruled. T.I.M.E., Inc. v.
United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
The present controversy over motor carrier rates charged on past
4
shipments arises because Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act
does not confer jurisdiction on the I.C.C. to make retroactive rate
adjustments. Part I of the act,5 which governs railroads, does provide
for retroactive rate adjustments through the medium of a repara6
tions suit brought by the shipper. The reparations suit is an action
7
for the damages sustained by the rail shipper in paying charges under
a published rate8 which is later declared unreasonable. Section 13
of Part I provides that the shipper may bring this suit in the appropriate federal district court or before the Commission, but despite
this choice of forum, the issue of the reasonableness of the rate must
be decided by the Commission in order to insure uniform treatment
under the act.10 The most important limitation on the reparations
suit under Part I has grown out of the Commission's power to control
12
rates prospectively." If the reasonableness of a rate is questioned,

3. 43 M.C.C. 337 (1944).
4. Motor Carrier Act §§ 201-227, 49 Stat. 543-67 (1935), as amended, 49
U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1952).
5. Interstate Commerce Act, Part I, 24 Stat. 379-87 (1887), as amended, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1-300 (1952).

6. The reparations provisions are to be found in §§ 8, 9, 13, 16 of Part I,
24 Stat. 382-84 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9, 13, 16 (1952).
7. The measure of recovery is the difference between the published rate
declared unreasonable and a reasonable charge as found by the Commission,
there being no need for the shipper to show actual damages. Southern Pacific
Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918). The original theory
was that since the shipper often passed on these charges to third parties it
would be necessary to show actual damages. Parsons v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 167 U.S. 447 (1897).
8. Under Part I and Part II the carrier initiates his own rates. These rates
must be filed with the Commission and kept open for public inspection in the
carrier's place of business. Part I, § 6, 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 6 (1952); Motor Carrier Act § 217, 49 Stat. 560 (1935), as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 317 (1952). Under these sections a carrier cannot deviate from
the published rates until he effects a charge under a specified procedure. An
exception to this no deviation rule exists in certain specific instances where
the carrier may reduce his charges without changing his rate. See § 22, 24
Stat. 387 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 22 (1952).
9. 24 Stat. 383 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
10. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907)
established this doctrine of primary jurisdiction. See Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 577 (1957).
11. The Commission can suspend a rate for a period not exceeding seven
months pending a determination of the reasonableness of the rate. Part I
§ 15(7), 24 Stat. 384 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1952). If during
this period, or after, the Commission finds that the rate is unreasonable it
may prescribe a reasonable rate, or a maximum one for the future. Act of
June 29, 1906 § 4, 34 Stat. 589 (1906), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 15 (1952). The
original Interstate Commerce Act did not confer the power to prescribe rates.
Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 184
(1896). Of course, if the rate in question is approved, it shall continue to be
the effective rate.
12. One method of raising the question of reasonableness is, of course, to
file a reparations claim. When damages are not involved, the question may be
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the Commission may either approve the carrier's rate or prescribe a
new rate or a maximum limit for the future.'3 In either event the
rate has been approved by the Commission, and even though it may at
some future date be declared unreasonable this Commission-made rate
cannot be the subject of a reparations suit.1 4 Under Part II, the

Motor Carrier Act, the Commission has the same power to control
rates prospectively, 15 but, as previously suggested, there is no provision for reparations. However, section 216(d) 16 declares that unreasonable rates are unlawful, and section 216 (j)17 "saves" any right
or remedy not inconsistent with the statutory scheme. These two
sections were relied on in Bell Potato Chip Co. v. Aberdeen Truck
Lines, Inc., 18 where the Commission held that although it could not
award reparations it could determine the reasonableness of a motor
carrier rate as the basis for an action in the courts. This procedure,
specifically approved in two district court opinions, 19 permits the
Commission to do indirectly what it cannot do directly-a procedure
which the Supreme Court condemned in a 1951 case involving reparations under the Federal Power Act.20
In the instant case the Court is faced with the problem of applying
the proper judicial criterion to section 216(d) and (j) of the Motor
Carrier Act. The Court quickly disposes of the contention that 216 (d)
condemnation of unreasonable rates creates a statutory right in the
shipper to recover or resist unreasonable charges. 21 A much stronger
argument lies in the government's contention that a shipper's common law right against unreasonable charges survived the act by the
terms of the "saving" clause, section 216 (j). The issue raised is
whether such a right is inconsistent with the statutory pattern of
Part II. Bearing strongly on this issue is the conspicuous omission of
reparations provisions in Part II despite numerous attempts to add
raised on the complaint of any interested party, or by the Commission on its
own motion. Part I, § 15(7), 24 Stat. 384 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §
15(7).
13. See note 11 supra.
14. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
15. Motor Carrier Act § 216(e), (g), 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 316(e),
(g), (1952).
16. Motor Carrier Act § 216(d), 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 316(d)
(1952).

17. Motor Carrier Act § 216(j), 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. 316(j) (1952).
18. 43 M.C.C. 337 (1944).

19. United States v. Garner, 134 F. Supp. 16 (E.D.N.C. 1955); New York &
New Brunswick Auto Express Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 215 (Ct. Cl.
1954).

20. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwest Pub. Serv. Co. 341 U.S. 246
(1951). The Federal Power Act, like the Motor Carrier Act, declares that
unreasonable rates are unlawful, 49 Stat. 851, 16 U.S.C. § 824(d), but omits
the power to award reparations.
21. The argument that the Motor Carrier Act itself creates a right to reparations completely ignores the omission of reparations procedure which is
provided for in Part I. See note 6 supra.
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sections similar to those in Part J.22 The problem of construction
which arises in this regard involves a consideration of the effect
which the Bell ruling that a shipper "already" has a remedy had on
the failure of the proposed amendments. On this question the Court
split. The majority reasons that Congress did not approve the Bell
case by failing to legislate in derogation of that ruling when it considered and rejected the reparations amendments. Accordingly it
holds that any common law right of a shipper in respect to unreasonable charges is inconsistent with the act. The dissent, on the other
hand, feels that the Commission's ruling in Bell greatly influenced
Congress in the determination that no reparations provisions were
needed under Part II, and that, therefore, the common law remedy for
reparations fitted into the statutory scheme.
An analysis of the legislative history of the Motor Carrier Act and
of the relationship between motor carriers and shippers indicates that
the holding of the instant case is correct. Despite an earlier position to
the contrary,2 the Commission has favored an amendment which
would create uniformity by adding reparations provisions to ,the
Motor Carrier Act.24 Advocates of this change pointed out that it was
not only advantageous to small shippers, for whom the Bell procedure
was too cumbersome and expensive, but to carriers as well since
they would be protected by the two-year statute of limitations featured in the proposed amendments.25 The motor carrier industry, on
the other hand, argued that such an addition to the act would not
bring about uniformity because application of reparations provisions
to their industry, made up primarily of small truckers, might prove
ruinous, while the Commission-made maximum rate structure of the
26
railroads gave that industry a virtual immunity to reparations suits.
22. S. 1310, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940); H.R. 2324, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1947); S. 1194, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940); S. 378, 85th Cong., 1st

Sess.

(1957).
23. In the early stages of regulation it was felt that motor carriers should

not be burdened with reparation claims. See, e.g., statement of Chairman

Owen Clarke, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation
of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 377, 378,

937, 939, 943, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 29, at 49, (1957).
24. Ibid. See also the letter of Walter M. Splawn, Hearings Before the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 2324, 2295, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. p.5 (1947).
25. See, e.g., statement of F. F. Estes, Hearings Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 2324, 2295, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. p. 17 (1947); Statement of E. L. Lacey, Hearings Before A Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
S. 571, 935, 1194, 290, 2426, 80th Cong.,

2nd Sess.

p. 66 (1948).

26. "The Interstate Commerce Commission has had the power to prescribe
maximum reasonable rates, insofar as railroads are concerned, since 1906
a period of 42 years. ... [W]ith respect, to motor carriers . . .a period
a.

of 12 years. By 1931, in its annual report to the Congress the Commission
stated it had had occasion to pass upon the reasonableness of railroad rates
generally in all sections of the country .... In the twelve years it has had
to prescribe rates for motor carriers . . . no such end has resulted. .

.

. [A]
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Considering the argument that the Bell procedure discriminates
against small shippers, it would seem anomalous that Congress confirmed by implication this admittedly inadequate remedy while rejecting a simpler, more efficient one. It seems more logical to conclude,
as in the present case, that no remedy, common law or otherwise, was
contemplated by the act. Such a conclusion will not work a great
injustice on shippers.2 7 Competition plus the power of the Commission
to control rates prospectively should provide the necessary safeguards
to keep rates within the zone of reasonableness. Indeed, it seems that
under the present scheme it is the award of reparations which would
often be unfair 28

LABOR LAW-LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACTSTATE COURT DAMAGES ARE OBTAINABLE ONLY WHERE
k
THE CONDUCT COULD BE ENJOINED
Desiring to organize respondent's employees, petitioner peacefully
picketed respondent's lumberyards. The National Labor Relations
Board declined to exercise jurisdiction over the resulting dispute,
apparently because respondent's interstate purchases did not exceed
$1,000,000 annually.' Respondent then obtained both an injunction
majority of those rates have never been ruled on in that respect." Statement
of John Lawrence, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S.571, 935, 1194, 290, 2426, 80th Cong.,
2nd Sess. p. 63 (1948). The doctrine of the Arizona Grocery Case, note 11
supra, is fatal to reparations suits where the rate has been prescribed or
approved by the Commission before later being found unreasonable,
27. "Rates are under continuous scrutiny. Administrative condemnation
implies new circumstances or new understanding rather than serious past
injustice. And, as Mr. Justice Jackson observes in the Montana-Dakota case,
the overcharge has usually been passed along by the one who paid it to some
undiscoverable and unreimbursable consumer." Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction
Reconsidered, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 577, 589 (1957).
28. It should be borne in mind that the standard of reasonableness is not
a definite fixed standard. It is pre-eminently a question upon which the
opinions of the Commission and the carriers may differ, and the act contemplates an original exercise of the Carrier's judgment. See Interstate Commerce Commission 33rd Annual Report to Congress p. 17, 18 (1919). Having
exercised his judgment in selecting a rate he can charge no other until the
"legal" rate is either suspended or changed by a specified procedure. Motor
Carrier Act §§ 217 (b), (c), (e), (g), 49 Stat. 560 (1935), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 317 (b), (c), (e), (g) (1952). Reparations under these circumstances would be particularly severe for small operators who do not have
rate and tariff experts in their employ.
1. This is one of the standards for retail enterprises included in NLRB
Press Release R-449, July 15, 1954. It was the rule of decision for the Hogue
& Knotts Supermarkets case, 110 NLRB 543 (1954). This standard has
since been made obsolete by new rules which appear in NLRB Press Release
R-576, October 2, 1958.
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and an award of damages in California courts. 2 The judgment was
reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States as to the injunction and remanded for a reconsideration of the issue of damages
since it was not clear on what basis damages had been given.3 On
remand, the state court, applying California law,4 upheld the award
of damages., On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States,
held, reversed. When a state court is pre-empted from enjoining
peaceful union activity because the activity is "arguably subject" to
6
section 7 or section 8 of the Labor Management Relations Act, it
cannot award damages for injury resulting from that activity. San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
The instant case is the latest 7 in a series of decisions involving the
complex problem 8 of state pre-emption in the labor relations field.9
Though the problem is basically one of ascertaining legislative intent, Congress has given no precise statement of its policy in this
regard.' 0 The Court has reserved to the NLRB sole jurisdiction over
2. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 45 Cal.2d 657, 291 P.2d 1

(1955).
3. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957). The
uncertainty involved was a question as to which law the state court had
applied. The Court apparently feared that the state court had applied
federal law.
4. CAL. CiV.

CODE

§§ 1667, 1708;

CAL. LABOR CODE §§

1115-1120.

5. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal.2d 595, 320 P.2d 473

(1958).
6. 61 Stat. 136 (1957), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1952). This discussion is
principally concerned with only that portion of the LMRA which amended
the older National Labor Relations Act. These are §§ 151-67. Section 7 of these
amendments enumerates those labor practices which are to be considered
protected by federal law, and § 8 specifies which union and management
activities are prohibited as unfair labor practices. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29.
U.S.C. § 157-58 (1952).
7. The first case in the series was Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942). While this indicates that
the pre-emption problem in the labor field is relatively recent, it should
be remembered that the general doctrine of pre-emption has been evolving
in others areas of the law for many years. E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
8. Best characterized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who has written a number of the opinions on these matters, as "Delphic." International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
9. See generally on federal and state jurisdiction, Cox & Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HAnv. L. REv. 211 (1950); Cox, Federalism in
the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954); Gerash, Recent

Action in the No-Man's Land of Labor Law, 33 DICTA 199 (1956); Glushien,
Federal Preemption in Labor Relations, 15 FED. B.J. 4 (1955); Isaacson, Federal Versus State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 42 A.B.A.J. 415 (1956);
James, State Against Federal Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 31 CONN. B.J.
5 (1957); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction Over

Labor Relations, 59 COL. L. REv. 6 (1959); Petro, Labor Relations Law, 32
N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1957); Roche & Hanslowe, NLRB Absolutism-A Dogma
Revisited, 6 LAB. L.J. 279 (1955); Rose, The Labor Management Relations
Act and the State's Power to Grant Relief, 39 VA. L. R.v. 765 (1953); Turnbull, Federal-State JurisdictionalProblems, 7 LAB. L.J. 5 (1956); Wellington,
Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. CHr. L. REV. 542 (1959).
10. Congress specifically permitted state action in only two instances under
Taft-Hartley. Section 14 (b) provides that states may pass more stringent
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conduct protected by the act," and for the most part over that which
the act prohibits.' 2 If the conduct is within the scope of the LMRA
and the NLRB declines to accept jurisdiction, a state court is nevertheless precluded from acting. This creates a "no-man's land" in
which the injured party has no recourse to either an administrative
or a judicial tribunal.' 3 Local authorities have been permitted however to deal with activity which, though presumably prohibited by
the LMRA, falls within the traditional police power to maintain
order and protect property. 14 Thus in United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Constr. Corp.,5 the Court allowed a state court damage
judgment to stand since the defendant union had engaged in violent
and destructive activity.' 6 Furthermore state tribunals retain both
provisions limiting the union shop than those appearing in the LMRA. 61
Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (b) (1952). Section 10 (a) allows the
NLRB to cede jurisdiction over certain cases to state agencies, provided that
state law is virtually identical with the federal legislation. 61 Stat. 146 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1952). As yet no cases have been ceded under this
provision. While granting these specific powers, the Congress apparently
thought that the states were to retain others not mentioned. See note 14
infra. As the Court itself has said, the LMRA "leaves much to the states,
though Congress has refrained from telling us how much." Garner v. Teamsters Union Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
11. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); International Union UAW, CIO v. O'Brien,
339 U.S. 454 (1950); Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
12. Capital Serv., Inc., v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954); Garner v. Teamsters
Union Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), 7 VAND. L. REV.422 (1954); Plankinton
Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 338 U.S. 953 (1950)
(per curiam).

13. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). The doctrine
that the NLRB may exercise its discretion to decline jurisdiction on the
basis of the volume of an employer's business has never been specifically
approved by the Court. Indeed, the Court has made it clear that such
discretion is limited by ruling that the Board may not refuse to hear cases
by excluding from its jurisdiction a whole category of employment. Office
Employees Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957); Hotel Employees v. Leedom,
358 U.S. 99 (1958). The doctrine has at times been bitterly criticized.

See Roche & Hanslowe, NLRB Absolutism-A Dogma Revisited, 6 LAB. L.J.
279 (1955). However, the Court did speak of the Board's use of this discretion approvingly at least once. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council,
341 U.S. 675 at 684 (1951). Presumably this controversy has been settled by
recent legislation. See infra note 34.
14. This policy is apparently in accord with the wishes of the Congress
responsible for the Taft-Hartley Act. E.g., Senator Taft, urging passage of
the act: "But suppose there is duplication in extreme cases; suppose there
is a threat of violence constituting violation of the law of the State.
Why should it not be an unfair labor practice? . . . [Tihere is no reason in

the world why there should not be two remedies for an act of that kind." 93
CONG.. REc. 4024 (1947).
An excellent example of this policy appears in
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957). In this case the Court
upheld an injunction issued by an Arkansas court only insofar as it was
acting to restrain violent or potentially violent conduct and struck down
those portions of the injunction which banned all picketing.
15. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
16. That the violent conduct was the basis of decision became certain only
with the decision of the instant case. Previously one might have been led
to believe that the nature of the remedy sought was just as important, for
much of the opinion alludes to the inadequacy of the NLRB remedy as compared to a damages award. 347 U.S. at 663-64. It has been argued that Board
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legal - and equitable powers over matters felt to be of "merely
peripheral concern" to federal labor policy, even though technically
covered by the LMRA. 17 Until the decision in the instant case,
the question remained unanswered as to whether state courts could
award traditional tort damages for conduct which such courts have
no jurisdiction to enjoin. 18
The instant case holds that no damages may be awarded by the
state court in such a case. The Court's decision is premised on its
conclusion, derived from numerous previous cases, that Congress
established the NLRB to achieve uniformity in the handling of labor
disputes. 19 Building on this premise, the Court reasons that both
federal and state courts must ordinarily be restrained from considering controversies which may fall within the Board's jurisdic2
tion,20 reserving to the Board primary jurisdiction ' to determine
whether specific conduct is comprehended by LMRA provisions. 22
judgments could include damages as well as prohibitory relief. See Petro,
Labor Relations Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267, 273 (1957).
17. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), 12
VAND. L. REV. 287 (1958). In Gonzales, a state court was permitted to order
the offending union to reinstate an expelled member and pay him back
wages even though the NLRB could have provided similar relief under § 8
(b) (2) of the LMRA. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1952).

Wellington regrets the phrase "merely peripheral concern" but adds that it is
"as good an explanation as one can make." Wellington, Labor and the
FederalSystem, 26 U. Cwr.L. REV. 542, 555 (1959).
18. Because the conduct in the Gonzales case-expulsion of a union member-was peaceful, some were convinced that states could award damages
even though their jurisdiction to issue injunction had been pre-empted. See,
e.g., Note 36 TEx. L. REV. 952, 955 (1958); 43 MiNN. L. REV. 341, 347-48
(1959). But see 12 VAND. L. REV. 287, 290 n. 17 (1958).
19. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Frankfurter quotes from Garner
v. Teamsters Union Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953): "'Congress did not
merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal
competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide
primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially
Congress evidently considered that centralized
constituted tribunal ....
administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain
uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities
and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes
.... '" 359 U.S. at 242-43.
20. 359 U.S. at 245.
21. It should be remembered that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
a concept separate and distinct from the pre-emption doctrine, though closely
allied to it. "Primary jurisdiction" is the power to make initial decisions
in a given field, exclusive of all other judicial bodies, including the federal
courts as well as state tribunals. Pre-emption principles are applicable
only after this initial determination has been made. The Court utilizes
both these doctrines in the instant case in a manner which might make it
appear that primary jurisdiction is but a facet of pre-emption to one unfamiliar with the two principles. On primary jurisdiction, see DAViS, An1MUISTRATivE LAW § 197 (1951).

22. This proposition that the board must initially determine whether the
controversy is covered by the LMIRA is rendered less restrictive by the
qualification that a court may determinefor itself that certain conduct is
undsessentialyprobably
appled to
precednt
there
when359
covered
precedent
compelling
246. The phrase
U.S.isat compelng
puted facts."
refers to decisions on violent activity. The Court acknowledges that it had
previously been less cautious and had once undertaken to decide for itself
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Hence, if the conduct is "arguably subject"2 3 to these statutory provisions, the state court is powerless to act.24 It does not matter that
the injured party has asked for relief under a state law of general
application rather than a labor control statute, 3 nor that damages
are sought rather than an injunction. Since damages as well as
injunctions may constitute a means of regulation and since Congress'
chosen regulatory agent does not have the power to award damages, 20
the Court concludes that this is an inappropriate method of control
for any tribunal to exercise. 27 It is therefore the nature of the conduct complained of, not the character of the relief sought, which gives
,the state court jurisdiction. 28
Congress has lessened the impact of the Garmon decision somewhat
by enacting the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosures Act
of 1959.29 Two provisions are added to the Taft-Hartley Act,30 elimithe status of disputed conduct in order to decide a case. 359 U.S. at 245 n.4.
The allusion Mr. Justice Frankfurter makes is to the Briggs-Stratton case,
in which the Court permitted a state agency to forbid frequent work stoppages which the Court described as an unfair labor practice. International
Union, UAWA v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
That decision has never been cited by the Court as a compelling precedent,
although spoken of with approval in the Garner decision. Garner v. Teamsters
Union Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953). The concurring opinion by Mr.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Whittaker and Stewart, states that

parties should not be required to defer their suit in order to obtain an NLRB
ruling. 359 U.S. at 249-54 (1959).
23. 359 U.S. at 245.
24. Once the NLRB has found that the controversy is not covered by the
LMRA, a new question arises: May the state courts assert jurisdiction at all?
This matter is expressly postponed for later decision in individual cases.
"[T]he Board may decide that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited, and thereby raise the question whether such activity may be regulated by the States." 359 U.S. at 245.
25. The Court's statement to this effect may well be a reply to a contention, first advanced by Professor Cox, that state laws of general application
should not be precluded from taking effect unless in virtually direct conflict
with a federal labor enactment. See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor
Relations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1z97, 1321-22 (1954).
26. Except in very special instances, as in making an award of back pay in
a reinstatement proceeding. But see Petro, supra note 16.
27. 359 U.S. at 247. This would seem to be inconsistent with some of the
language found in the Laburnum opinion. As an example: "The primarily
private nature of claims for damages under state law also distinguishes them
in a measure from the public nature of the regulation of future labor relations under federal law." United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum, 347 U.S.
656, 665 (1954). As the majority has pointed out in their opinion, however,
the Laburnum case should be read in view of the very narrow question there
before the court, which related to violent conduct alone.
28. 359 U.S. at 247-48.
29. 73 Stat. 519-46 (1959).
30. Section 701 provides:
"(c) (1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by
published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act,
decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class
or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect
of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall not
decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would
assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
"(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency
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nating the "no-man's land." The first of these provisions permanently
fixes the minimum jurisdictional standards of the NLRB at the level
of those in effect August 1, 1959, and requires the Board to hear all
controversies meeting these minimum requirements. 31 The second permits state courts to assert jurisdiction over any controversy which
the Board declines to hear "by rule of decision or by published
rules." 32 Had these amendments to the LMRA been in effect at the
time of the Garmon case, the state court would have had jurisdiction.
However, while the new act is designed to insure the existence of a
forum for all labor controversies, it also creates some new problems.
Before accepting jurisdiction, the state court, on its own motion or
that of opposing counsel, may well require a complainant to show
that the NLRB has declined to hear the case. If the complainant's
application to the Board has been refused, that is the end of the
matter. On the other hand, should the complainant rely instead on
the theory that NLRB would refuse to act because of an established
rule,33 the state court will be confronted with a more complex decision since it would then assume the burden of interpreting those
rules. 34 Moreover, once a state court has properly decided to adjudior the courts of any State or Territory (including the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines,
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction."
73 Stat. 541-42 (1959).

31. This should not be construed to bar the Board from asserting jurisdiction over disputes which affect commerce even though these particular

standards are not met, so long as the Board proceeds by rule of decision
as it has in the past. The Court has specifically approved such departure
by the Board from accustomed practice, e.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
32. See note 30 supra.
33. In the past, the Board has always proceeded by rule of decision on
matters of jurisdiction, enunciating a change of policy while determining a
case. In this way, the requirement of the agency has been quite flexible, as
indicated by their occasional willingness to take a case where the amount
involved, was below their announced standards. See note 31 supra. Should
the Board now choose to alter this practice and promulgate published rules,
it would be allowed to change them only after complying with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended,
5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1952). See note 30 supra. These requirements include
publication of notice of intended changes to parties who might be interested,
provisions for a hearing on the change, and the like. In order to preserve
its flexibility, the NLRB may prefer not to issue published rules, leaving
the state courts to be guided by principles set forth from decision to decision.
34. Such interpretations may well be complex, as Senator Morse pointed
out in the debates preceding passage of these amendments. Among other
difficulties, he noted these: Since the NLRB determines whether its jurisdictional standards have been met not as of the time of the alleged unfair,
labor practice, but as of the time of hearing, the state court may have to
predict when such hearing would be held. Moreover, the standards themselves are often complex and confusing, and would be especially so to a court
which deals with labor matters only infrequently. In support, he quotes from
an opinion of a state judge criticizing the Board's involved rules. Universal
Car Co. v. IAM, 35 L.R.R.M. 2087, 2098 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1954). 105 CONG. REc.
16389-95 (daily ed., Sept. 3, 1959). These factors might cause the Supreme,
Court to look unfavorably on the prospect of state- court interpretation of,
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cate a dispute, it must then determine whether state or federal law
is to be applied.5
With the passage of this Labor Reform Act, it becomes convenient
to speak of labor disputes in terms of three general categories: (1)
disputes involving enterprises which do not affect interstate commerce; (2) disputes involving businesses which do affect commerce,
but over which the NLRB does not choose to assert jurisdiction; and
(3) disputes involving employers whose businesses meet the jurisdictional standards of the Board. State courts will continue to have
sole jurisdiction over all cases in the first category. 36 As to cases
within the second group, local tribunals may henceforth assume
jurisdiction over disputes which the NLRB declines to hear. 37 The
effect of the Garmon decision is now largely limited to the third
class of controversies even though its factual situation would actually
place it in the second group. It is in this third area that suits for
damages cannot be maintained in state courts unless injunctive relief would be available under the same facts. The combined effect
of the Garmon decision and the new statute is that an employer,
engaged in interstate commerce to only a limited extent, is given
an anti-union weapon in the form of suits in state courts for compensatory and punitive damages which are not available to firms
more substantially engaged in interstate commerce. To some the
wisdom of this policy may seem dubious; it is conceivable that certain states may now be tempted to pass restrictive labor legislation
designed to lure small industry formerly in the "no-man's land." Yet,
the overall effect of the Garmon decision and the new federal act
will probably be salutary. The act abolishes the "no-man's land,"
and the instant case provides some clear principles by which statefederal relations in labor matters may be regulated.
Board rules. Possibly local tribunals should be allowed to apply to the Board
for an advisory opinion from time to time.
Since this article was set in print, the NLRB announced the establishment
of such a procedure. See NLRB Press Release R-639, Nov. 8, 1959.
35. In all probability the Congress intends state law to apply. This conclusion follows from the rejection by Congress of the "Prouty Amendment"
to the new statute. This amendment specifically called for application of
federal law. S. 1555, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. § 701 (1959). However, since the
overall purpose of congressional action on labor matters has been to
achieve a uniform national policy, a forceful argument could be put forward
for the proposition that national statutes should be applied.
36. In such cases, the provisions of the LMRA have never been applied,
since the authority for the act is the commerce clause of the Constitution.
See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt., Inc., 354 U.S.
284 (1957). In this case the state was allowed to enjoin peaceful picketing
of a gravel pit whose business was purely local in character.
37. This power is in addition to the present jurisdiction over disputes
involving violence and matters of "peripheral concern." As to this "peripheral" area, one can speculate that the greatly increased regulation of
internal union affairs called for by the new statute may diminish the
number of "peripheral concerns" considerably. Possibly the facts of the
Gonzales case, supra notes 17 and 18, would now result in a different decision.

959]1

RECENT CASES

RADIO AND TELEVISION-FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT
-STATIONS ARE IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR
DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS BY CANDIDATES FOR
PUBLIC OFFICE
An action for libel was brought by petitioner against respondent
broadcasting station. The suit arose as a result of an alleged defamatory speech over respondent's facilities made by a political candidate
in reply to prior addresses by his opponents.' In compliance with section 315 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934,2 requiring stations to grant equal time to candidates for public office and denying
stations the right of censorship, respondent allowed the candidate to
broadcast his remarks uncensored. The state courts dismissed the
complaint on the ground that section 315 impliedly immunized the
station from liability for the alleged defamation.3 On certiorari to the
'Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed (five-to-four
decision). Under section 315 a station licensed under the act has no
power to censor material broadcast by a candidate for public office
and broadcasting stations are therefore immune from liability for
libelous statements so broadcast. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v.
WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
In Sorensen v. Wood,4 the first case construing the provision in
question,5 the Nebraska court held that the predecessor of section 315
permitted censorship of all defamatory remarks not concerned with
germane political issues6 and therefore did not grant broadcasting
stations an implied immunity from liability for defamatory statements made by political candidates. The Federal Communications
Commission in Port Huron Broadcasting Co. 7 construed section 315
1. A. C. Townley, a legally qualified candidate in the 1956 United States
in North a Dakota, accused his opponents and petitioner of
senatorial
conspiring race
to "establish
Communist Farmers Union Soviet right here in
North Dakota." 360 U.S. at 526-27.
2. The statute reads:
"(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified
candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall
afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in
the use of such broadcasting station: provided, That such licensee shall
have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the
provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to
allow the use of its station by any such candidate." 48 Stat. 1088 (1934),
as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) (1952).
3. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the state
district court dismissing the action. 89 N.W.2d 102 (1958).
4. 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).
5. The court was considering § 18 Federal Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162,
from which § 315 was taken verbatim.
6. "[T]he prohibition of censorship of material broadcast . . . merely prevents the licensee from censoring the words as to their political and
.partisan trend..... ." 243 N.W. at 85.
7. 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948). For a complete discussion of the doctrine of the
case see Note, Censorship of Defamatory, Political Broadcasts: The Port
Huron Doctrine, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 127 (1959).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

as an absolute prohibition against censorship and an inferential grant
of immunity from actions for defamation. The Commission and a
majority of the courts have adhered to the Port Huron doctrine, 8
while some courts have adopted the Sorensen theory. 9 Proponents
of the majority view insisted that Congress did not intend to expose
broadcasters to actions for defamation when they have no power to
avoid liability.'0 The minority, on the other hand, contended that the
legislative history of the act shows a definite intent to exclude the
alleged immunity, since an amendment expressly granting immunity
was proposed but not adopted.'1 This difference of opinion has left
broadcasters in a dilemma. Failure to censor may subject them to'an
action for libel and censorship may cause revocation of their license
by the FCC.' 2 While recognizing this problem, critics of the Port
Huron doctrine contended that depriving the states of their traditional
power to adjudicate common law defamation actions and abrogating
state statutes on the subject require a clear declaration of intent by
13
Congress.
The instant case represents the first interpretation of section 315
by the Supreme Court, the majority adopting the conclusions of the
Port Huron decision. The majority held that the prohibition against
censorship was complete and that it was not the intent of Congress to
14
allow broadcasters to delete any material from candidates' speeches
and that, therefore, the immunity of the licensee is necessarily implied. 15 The Court thought there was significance in the fact that in
all cases denying immunity the courts have first found that the licen8. See Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1958); Felix v.
Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 186 F.2d
1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951) (immunity does not apply
when the speaker is an authorized spokesman for the candidate); Yates v.
Associated Broadcasters, Inc., 7 R.R. 2088 (1951); WDSU Broadcasting Co.,
7 R.R. 769 (1951); Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn.
605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955); Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179
Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
9. See Houston Post Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Tex. 1948);
Daniell v. Voice of New Hampshire, Inc., 10 R.R. 2045 (1954).
10. Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928, 932 (M.D. Tenn. 1958) (liability
could be avoided by granting time to no candidates but such action would
not be in the public interest). For a report on this case see 12 VAND. L. REV.
301 (1958).

11. The Senate adopted an amendment to § 18 of the Radio Act of 1927

which granted a station immunity from liability for uncensored utterances.

67 CONG. REc. 12501 (1926). But this provision was removed by the conference committee without any explanation. H.R. REP. No. 1886, 69th Cong.,
2d Sess. 10, 18 (1927).
12. 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 303(m) (1) (A) (1952). This section
gives the commission authority to suspend the license of any operator who
has violated any provision of any act of the United States.
13. 360 U.S. at 535 (dissenting opinion).
14. 360 U.S. at 527.
15. "In no case has a court even implied that the licensee would not be
rendered immune were it; denied the power to censor libelous material."
360 U.S. at 531.
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see has some right of censorship. 16 The contention that the legislative
history of section 315 indicates congressional intent not to grant
immunity was rejected since Congress has not acted to depart from
the Commission's view since it was reported in 1948.17 The dissent
argued 18 that since immunity was not expressly granted by Congress
it should not be implied when such implication would pre-empt
normal state concepts of defamation law from its application to licensees.19 While recognizing this argument, the majority indicated its
willingness to abrogate state law where such law obstructs the accomplishment of congressional objectives.20
The arguments presented on both sides of the question indicate a
conflict in public policy. If stations are immune, the person defamed
may be left without a legal remedy,21 while on the other hand a
denial of immunity will subject broadcasters to liability for acts
over which they have no control. For some reason Congress has not
seen fit to resolve this conflict but has left the question for the
courts.22 The decision in the instant case is the only just result in

view of the important public service rendered by radio and television
in bringing political issues to the attention of the voting public.
Whether the Court's interpretation of the section is a true expression
of legislative intent is still open to conjecture. If it is not, the
decision will still serve a purpose by stimulating legislative clarification. As the majority opinion points out, the holding is merely a
reading of the section according to what seems to be its "underlying
purpose,"2 and since the conclusion reached is entirely reasonable
Congress will probably acquiesce through continued inaction on the
subject.
16. See note 6 supra. For cases following this view see note 9 supra.
17. The Commission reported its position to Congress in 14 F.C.C. Ann.
Rep. 28 (1948).
18. Mr. Justice Frankferter, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice

Whittaker and Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting.

19. 360 U.S. at 545-46.
20. 360 U.S. at 535.
21. See Fridenthal & Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation On
Political Broadcasting: Section 315 of The Communications Act, 72 HARv.
L. REv. 445, 487 (1959). The author cites a situation where it would not be
practical to sue the candidate because he is not amenable to process in a
convenient forum or he has no assets.
22. Having found no definite indication of legislative intent in a search
of available congressional records and knowing that Congress was cognizant
of the problem, it can only be assumed that the law makers were undecided.
23. 360 U.S. at 535.

